for the jury to arrive at a proper conclusion of present worth. If defendant, at the time of trial, had any objection or request for additions to these instructions, he should have made them at that time. Accordingly, we hold there was no error in the instructions given to the jury.
Finally, defendant argues that the $135,000 verdict awarded by the jury is excessive. In deciding this, we must again construe the evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff. Daniel v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie RR Co., supra. It is not the court's function to second-guess the jury, but only determine if there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding. Appleman v. United States, 338 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1964).
From the evidence, the jury could have found that plaintiff lost over $10,000 in past wages to trial.
They could also have found that plaintiff's future earning capacity was impaired by his inability to perform tile-setting. This could reasonably amount to approximately $10,000 a year;
and if taken to age 65, this would be $120,000. Reduced to present value, it would represent about $83,800. The fact that plaintiff did not, up to this point, do tile-setting full-time, would not limit the jury from finding on that basis, for the recovery is for impairment of earning capacity ( Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966); see also, Koehler v. United States, 187 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1951)) and the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that plaintiff's earning capacity was impaired to the extent of $10,000 a year. The jury could have arrived at a similar conclusion on a different basis (e.g. earnings impairment for a lesser amount but for plaintiff's full life expectancy). The calculation is not a simple substraction of before and after wages. Faudree v. Iron City Sand & Gravel Co., 315 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1963).
This leaves a balance of approximately $41,000, which must be ascribed to pain and suffering. Where a fair recompense for injuries cannot be equated in any mathematical way, with any number of dollars, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Smith v. Coy, 460 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972). This case is of that nature. It cannot be said that $41,000 for pain and suffering out of a $135,000 verdict is grossly excessive in light of plaintiff's life expectancy of approximately 21 years and the nature of the injuries he sustained.
There being sufficient grounds for the jury to conclude that plaintiff was entitled to $135,000, the verdict is not excessive and defendant's motion for a new trial is denied.