As John T. Dunlop's affidavit most appropriately pointed out, "it is essential that our decisions are made with a view to all consequences upon the total economy, rather than only upon one sector."
This Court feels that the public interest will not be furthered through judicial intervention in an area that is fraught with intricate complexities of economics -- supply and demand, inflationary and deflationary trends, market responses and predictions -- these matters have been properly and duly delegated to the Council by the Congress of the United States under the Act.
This Court must assume that the Council sincerely believes, even during this period of economic hardship, that its long-range objectives will come to fruition through the enforcement of the price restrictions. Great weight must be placed on the judgment and expertise of the agency involved. University of Southern California v. Cost of Living Council, 472 F.2d 1065 (T.E.C.A. 1972). On the grounds that the granting of the requested relief could interfere with the best interests of the public, plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied.
Request for Certification to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
In order to provide uniformity and consistency of decisions concerning the Act, Congress has established the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ("TECA"), into which all decisions of the District Courts involving interpretation of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder must be channeled. Section 211(c) of the Act provides that the District Court must certify all constitutional issues determined to be substantial in nature to the TECA for resolution. Essentially, Sections 211(c) and 211(g) operate to divest this Court of authority to decide a substantial constitutional question arising from the provisions of the Act and dictate immediate referral to the TECA of any such issue.
This Court's sole function, then, is to determine the singular narrow question as to whether or not the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiff are substantial. The District Court, in Delaware Valley Apt. House Owners Ass'n v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Pa. 1972), declared that a constitutional issue is not substantial if it has previously been decided by the Supreme Court or is obviously without merit.
As stated earlier in the opinion, plaintiff's claim is not devoid of merit, nor wholly insubstantial. However, the basic legal principles relative to plaintiff's due process and equal protection arguments have been litigated to a great extent and have been resolved by the Supreme Court.
The authority of the Federal Government to control wages and prices in the public interest is now well established. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944). Indeed, in American Power and Light Co. v. S. E.C., 141 F.2d 606, 623 (1st Cir. 1944), aff'd 329 U.S. 90, 67 S. Ct. 133, 91 L. Ed. 103 (1946), the Court stated:
". . . not every curtailment or impairment of existing rights, nor every incidental business loss resulting from regulatory legislation is a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."