of the plaintiff Boards, but that question subsumes two issues. The first is whether there are any limitations at all upon the power of a delegate agency such as Temple to dissolve a given program advisory board and replace it with a new citizen participation component. If there are limitations on this power, such limitations are in the nature of maximum feasible community participation requirements; hence the second issue is whether there was such participation in the displacement of plaintiff Boards, or whether under the circumstances of the case the delay of plaintiff Boards in effecting a merger justified the defendants' actions. The other major question in the case, which we reach only if we find that the plaintiff Boards were improperly displaced, is whether the Boards were afforded a role consistent with the statutory mandate in terms of their participation in the program budget and selection of the project director. The positions of the parties on these issues are widely disparate.
2. Does a Delegate Agency Possess the Power, Free of Limitation, to Dissolve and Replace a Program Advisory Board
The proper disposition of the first issue is clear. We reject Temple's argument that there are no limitations upon the power of a delegate agency to dissolve and replace an advisory board. The argument is that: (1) the statute itself does not contemplate the existence of program advisory boards, which exist only by virtue of a provision in the Regulations that a delegate agency must "establish" a program advisory board (45 C.F.R. § 1060.1-2(b)(5)(iii); (2) the Regulations and Guidelines impose no express limitations upon the powers of a delegate agency insofar as dissolving and replacing an advisory board is concerned; (3) absent a statutory limitation, the general rule is that the power to establish or appoint necessarily carries with it the power to dissolve or remove; and (4) to hold that defendants do not have that power unless its use is first agreed to by plaintiffs would mean that such a decision and, ultimately, control of the entire program would really rest in plaintiffs' hands, which is not the intent of the law.
The answer to these arguments is that if the delegate agency had such an absolute power unilaterally to dissolve community participation components, then "community participation" would be meaningless because the grantee and the administrative agency would be free to dismiss any community board arbitrarily whenever they disagreed with the community board's views or, indeed, whenever they felt like it. This approach would thwart the entire thrust of the statute under which these health centers were created and would negate the effort to have community residents apply their own insights into their own problems to programs designed to affect their lives. The applicable law did not require the creation of community boards merely for the purpose of having these boards serve as administrative units to be utilized or dissolved at the whim of the delegate agency or grantee. The statutes, Regulations, Guidelines, and Memorandum mandate the involvement of community representatives in the process of program planning, development, and implementation, in which the administering agency and the community board are to cooperate. Our rejection of Temple's argument is buttressed by a consideration of the applicable canons of statutory construction.
It is elementary that the main function of statutory construction is to give effect to the intention of Congress as expressed in the statute. In terms of source material, we of course look first to the statute itself to ascertain its plain meaning and to its legislative history. But in a matter such as this one, we must go beyond the statute and the legislative history and look to several other sources. First, we look to the Regulations promulgated under the statute, which have the force and effect of law. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S. Ct. 1, 92 L. Ed. 10 (1947). Secondly, we look to the "contemporaneous construction" of the statute by the administering agency, for it is entitled to great weight. Federal Trade Commission v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 79 S. Ct. 818, 3 L. Ed. 2d 893 (1959). In this instance that construction is reflected by the Guidelines. See North City I, supra, where the court referred to a form of administrative guideline termed a demonstration letter as the primary statement of the policy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development concerning the meaning of "citizen participation" as required by the Model Cities Act in Model Cities programs and in effect found its definition of "citizen participation" in that letter. And see also Chacon v. Hodgson, 465 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1972), where the court, citing Mandel, looked to Labor Department regulations which articulated criteria for resident participation in the prime sponsor and delegate agencies of a concentrated employment program.
There are other principles of statutory construction which will aid us in our deliberations. A statute must be construed as a whole. Therefore, the strongly expressed purpose for effective community participation, 42 U.S.C. § 2781(a)(4), the directive to community action agencies to establish effective procedures for community participation on a regular basis, 42 U.S.C. § 2795(b)(4), and the encouragement to develop neighborhood centers so as to maximize community participation in center planning, policymaking, administration, and operation, 42 U.S.C. § 2811, must be read as applying to the section authorizing the establishment of comprehensive health services projects, 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(4)(A). Moreover, we must assess the spirit of the Act as a factor in its interpretation, and our construction of the statute in the case before us must be consistent with that spirit. A consideration of the Act as a whole, including its spirit, and the Regulations and Guidelines renders the contention that the delegate agency may replace the community participation component at will totally inappropriate. Because, however, of the vigor with which it has been pressed, we must extend our discussion in this area to address Temple's argument that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove, and demonstrate why that argument misses the mark.
Temple has advanced this argument with the citation of a large number of cases. Most of those cases deal with public officials who were discharged by superior executive officers: Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 38 U.S. 230, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (a district court clerk); Ware v. United States, 4 Wall. 617, 71 U.S. 617, 18 L. Ed. 389 (1866) (a post office official); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 40 S. Ct. 374, 64 L. Ed. 692 (1920) (a landscape architect); Hargett v. Summerfield, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 243 F.2d 29, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970, 77 S. Ct. 1060, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1957) (a postmaster); Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965) (a welfare caseworker); Medoff v. Freeman, 362 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1966) (an agriculture department official); and Langford v. City of Texarkana, 337 F. Supp. 723 (W.D.Ark.1972) (three employees of a Model Cities program). Other cases relied upon deal with public officials whose terms were shortened because of legislative action. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 51 U.S. 402, 13 L. Ed. 472 (1850); Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, 183 N.E.2d 670, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 901, 83 S. Ct. 205, 9 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1962). All of these cases are inapposite. Neither PAAC nor Temple is a legislature nor an "employer" of the plaintiff Boards in the usual sense of that term, which is also the sense in which it is used in the government employment cases cited by Temple. Plaintiffs are agents not of defendants, but of the neighborhood residents served by the program. The Boards were created only because of the unique statutory interposition of this third force. Moreover, we note that the trend in the public employment cases has been to disfavor arbitrary exercise of the power to discharge in favor of a more democratic and procedurally circumscribed exercise of that power.
The remaining case upon which Temple relies is Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board v. Board of Education, 30 A.D.2d 447, 294 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1968), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 483, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568, 245 N.E.2d 219 (1969). The Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment in decentralized public education was a national cause celebre for quite some time. The public school system in New York City had historically been managed and operated by a single board of education. However, in 1967 the Board of Education committed itself to a policy of decentralization of its operations. As an incident of that policy it experimented with the concept of local district boards for three of the city's thirty school districts. Ocean Hill-Brownsville was one of the three school districts chosen and, in accordance with a state statute authorizing temporary experimentation in New York City with reconstituted local district boards in defined communities "to allow greater community initiative and participation in the development of educational policy for the public schools," the Board of Education created the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board. At first the powers of the local school board were advisory only. In 1968, however, the Board of Education, as directed by statute, delegated certain of its functions to the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board. Within a few months, following a disagreement between the Board of Education and the Governing Board over actions taken by the latter, the Board of Education suspended the Governing Board without charges, notice, or hearing. The Governing Board and all but one of its members commenced suit charging the Board of Education with statutory due process violations and seeking reinstatement. Relief was denied. The New York Court of Appeals, in dismissing the allegation of statutory violations, stated:
In summary, in the absence of legislation giving this local board autonomy, a fixed term of office, or a tenure terminable only for cause, the board is subject entirely both as to its powers and term of office to its creating agency, the city Board of Education.