Appeal from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of James T. Maston v. The Union Mining Company and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., Insurance Carrier, No. A-65892.
William C. Stillwagon, for appellant.
Daniel E. Long, Jr., for appellees.
Judges Crumlish, Jr., Wilkinson, Jr., and Rogers, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Crumlish, Jr.
The genesis of this controversy was a claim petition filed on April 27, 1970, by Appellant, James T. Maston, alleging that he had suffered a fall with resultant injuries on the company premises of the Union Mining
Company. Maston indicated that while leaving work on April 7, 1969 and while en route to the showers, he was walking down a ramp, slipped, fell and hit his head on the concrete ramp. The claim petition was subsequently amended, without objection, to show the date of injury as being April 11, 1969. Claimant, after several examinations by a doctor, was referred to a specialist who performed a left temporal parietal craniectomy and removed a massive chronic subdural hematoma in August of 1969. Another similar operation was performed in September and eventually, in March of 1970, a tantalum plate was inserted in his head.
At the hearings before the Referee, there was conflicting testimony as to the date of the accident, whether proper notice was given to the Employer, and the extent of Claimant's disability. The Referee, on the basis of testimony and other evidence adduced at the hearings, concluded that Claimant had met his burden of proving an accident and notice to the employer and determined that Claimant was totally disabled from April 12, 1969 and continues to be totally disabled. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, without taking additional testimony, reversed the Referee and disallowed compensation benefits.*fn1 We must reverse the decision of the Board and affirm the decision of the Referee.
The scope of review before the Board dictates this result. In Universal Cyclops Steel Corporation v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 176, 305 A.2d 757 (1973), this Court considered the effects of Acts 12 and 61 of 1972 which amended § 423 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 854. We there held
that a referee is no longer an agent of the Board and that, unless the Board chooses to hear new evidence in this situation, the Referee and not the Board is the ultimate fact finder. Not having taken additional evidence, the Board, under the mandate of Act 61, is to consider only the competence of the evidence presented to the Referee while the Referee considers the credibility of the evidence presented. The Board may also consider whether any conclusion reached by the Referee constitutes an error of law. Thus, where the Board has taken no additional evidence, this Court must rely on the facts as found by the Referee if they are supported by sufficient competent evidence. Palmer v. City of Pittsburgh, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 526, 308 A.2d 179 (1973); Barnold Shoes, Inc. v. Cunningham, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 73, 308 A.2d 189 (1973).
The Board, in its opinion, states that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to support an award. On its face, this statement shows that the Board was considering the case under the proper scope of review. Scrutiny of the record, however, and of other determinations of the Board clearly shows that the Board was considering credibility rather than competency. The Appellee, recognizing that the Board has resolved the issue on the basis of credibility, ...