Appeal from decree of Court of Common Pleas of York County, Jan. T., 1971, No. 10, in case of J. H. Yinger v. Jacob L. Springer and Daugherty & Twigg, Inc.
Michael Brillhart, with him Robert H. Griffith, Henry Torchia, and Markowitz, Kagen & Griffith, for appellant.
Joel O. Sechrist, with him Donald T. Puckett, and Eveler, Puckett & Trout, for defendant-appellee.
Robert E. Meyers, for additional defendant-appellee.
Jones, C. J., Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Justice O'Brien.
On April 23, 1971, appellant filed a complaint in equity against Jacob Springer to enforce specifically a
conveyance of real estate. Appellant's cause of action for specific performance was based on a written sales agreement dated July 19, 1968. The agreement of sale described the property in question as "the property known as R D 1 New Cumberland Jacob Springer's 80 acres more or less wich (sic) will exclude 7 acres of the 87 acres more or less." The agreement of sale was signed by appellant and an agent of Springer who was authorized to sell Springer's property. In Springer's answer to the complaint, he alleged that Daugherty & Twigg, Inc. (also an appellee), had procured the authorization to sell Springer's property by fraud. This matter was never reached at trial. At trial, after appellant presented his case, Springer's motion for a non-suit was denied. Springer then took the witness stand. After his testimony the chancellor reconsidered and then granted Springer's motion for a compulsory non-suit and ordered that all of his testimony be stricken from the record on the grounds that the agreement of sale contained an inadequate and insufficient description of the real estate to be conveyed. This appeal followed.
An examination of the testimony indicates that, at the time appellant concluded the presentation of his case, he had presented no evidence tending to show that the description of the land to be conveyed was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. However, when the chancellor indicated that he had changed his mind and decided to grant the non-suit, appellant's counsel asked for permission to reopen his case in order to offer evidence that there was no dispute as to what land was to be conveyed.*fn1 The court refused, ruling that parol evidence was not admissible. In this decision, we believe that the court was in error.
In Suchan v. Swope, 357 Pa. 16, 53 A.2d 116 (1947), we were presented with a similar situation to the instant case. In that case, the only writing that comprised the sales agreement stated: "Received of Anna Suchan Fifty ($50.00) dollars first payment on my ...