of heroin, two spoons, two needles, one syringe and three.38 caliber bullets. At trial petitioner confessed to possession of the narcotics found in his room.
Petitioner contends that the search and his resultant conviction was constitutionally defective. He contends that the evidence seized should have been suppressed under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
Other than the allegation that there was "no probable cause for arrest, search and seizure" he does not say specifically why the search was defective. He merely argues that Mapp applies. Mapp, of course, was decided after petitioner's trial and is not retroactive in its application to convictions which had become final prior to Mapp. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965).
Petitioner contends, however, that since The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1971 ordered that he be permitted to file post trial motions nunc pro tunc that his conviction never became "final"
for purposes of Linkletter and therefore, Mapp applies.
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas rejected petitioner's argument and held that his conviction was final prior to Mapp. The decision was affirmed per curiam, without opinions, by the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts.
We agree with the result of the state court decisions and, therefore, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, we think that the case is "final" and Mapp does not apply.
In Linkletter the Court discussed the policy reasons why Mapp should not be given retroactive effect. While it is true that this case may no longer be "final" because of the indulgence of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we do not think that technical definitions should be employed to override the public policy considerations which the Court discussed. The Court pointed out that:
". . . there are interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available or if located their memory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice." 381 U.S., at 637-638, 85 S. Ct. at 1742.