Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

COMMONWEALTH v. PUGH (11/16/72)

decided: November 16, 1972.

COMMONWEALTH, APPELLANT,
v.
PUGH



Appeal from order of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, March T., 1971, No. 895, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. William Pugh.

COUNSEL

James D. Crawford, Deputy District Attorney, with him Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Lenard H. Sigal, for appellee.

Wright, P. J., Watkins, Jacobs, Hoffman, Spaulding, Cercone, and Packel, JJ. Opinion by Packel, J.

Author: PACKEL

[ 223 Pa. Super. Page 114]

Forcible entry to execute a search warrant is permissible if the police have announced their identity and purpose and given the inhabitants a reasonable opportunity to open the door. Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968). Exigent circumstances permit an immediate breaking into a premises if the officer with a search warrant has reasonable grounds to believe that he is being refused admittance or that evidence is being destroyed. The issue raised in this case is whether a woman's lie about being alone is such an exigent circumstance.

The only testimony at the suppression hearing was that of the arresting officer. The police obtained a warrant to search for narcotics in defendant's house and then proceeded to the house at about 10:00 p.m. About two minutes after they rang the bell a woman leaned out an upstairs window. The policeman announced their identity and purpose, to which the woman replied that "she was home alone and that her husband was in jail." She left the window and then the officer heard her voice and a male voice. The policemen waited approximately thirty seconds to one minute and then broke into the house. Inside they found the defendant and the defendant's wife as well as eleven bundles of heroin. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of narcotics. At the suppression hearing, the judge granted the motion to suppress on the grounds that the officers had no intention of waiting for the door to be opened. The Commonwealth is appealing that decision.

[ 223 Pa. Super. Page 115]

The Commonwealth can appeal an order granting suppression of evidence if that order will result in a termination and conclusion of the prosecution or will result in a prosecution wherein the Commonwealth is substantially handicapped because it cannot present all its available evidence. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). Since the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics, the suppression of the heroin must necessarily, at the very least, substantially handicap the Commonwealth's case.

The appellee contends that the Commonwealth has no right of appeal because a factual question is involved. The real issue before us, however, is the legal question of whether a lie of the sort described is an exigent circumstance warranting forcible entry. This is not a case like Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 630, 168 A.2d 328, 329 (1961), involving an appeal from the grant of a new trial and which "involves primarily a factual question which lies peculiarly within the province of the trial court to resolve." Rather it is like Bosurgi, supra, in which there was the legal question of whether the police had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had committed a crime and therefore were justified in searching him. Since the police officer in the instant case was the only person testifying at the hearing, there is obviously no underlying factual question which was peculiarly within the province of a factfinder. Therefore, the Commonwealth has the right to appeal.

The reason for the rule limiting forcible entry is protection for the dignity and privacy of the occupants guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. See United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 401 F. 2d 765 (3d Cir. 1968). This personal constitutional guarantee is subject to the public interest in permitting police with a search warrant

[ 223 Pa. Super. Page 116]

    to take necessary and prompt steps to avoid the destruction of evidence. If the police could reasonably deduce that evidence was being destroyed from the fact that the woman lied to them about being ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.