who are members of, or are represented by District 50.
(o) An object of Respondents' picketing set forth in Finding of Fact 4(j) above, is to force or require Wheeler to recognize or bargain with Respondents as the representative of Wheeler's employees including mop man, carpenter, handyman, laborers, mechanics and clean-up man, and to force or require said employees to accept or select Respondents as their collective bargaining representatives, notwithstanding that Respondents are not currently certified as the representative of such employees. Wheeler has lawfully recognized in accordance with the Act another labor organization as the representative of such employees, and a question concerning the representation of such employees may not appropriately be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act.
(p) The acts and conduct of Respondents set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j) through (o), above, occurring in connection with the operation of Wheeler, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several states and tend to lead to and do lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
5. It may be fairly anticipated that unless enjoined, Respondents will continue and repeat the acts and conduct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j) through (o), above, or similar or like acts and conduct.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of this proceeding, and under Section 10(l) of the Act, is empowered to grant injunctive relief.
2. There is, and Petitioner has, reasonable cause to believe, that:
(a) Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Sections 2(5), 8(b) and 10(l) of the Act, and are agents of labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
(b) Wheeler is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
(c) Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(b) (4) (i) (ii), subparagraph (D), and 8(b) (7), subparagraph (A), of the Act, and a continuation of these practices will impair the policies of the Act as set forth in Section 1(b) thereof.
3. To preserve the issues for the orderly determination as provided in the Act, it is appropriate, just, and proper that, pending the final disposition of the matters herein involved pending before the NLRB, Respondents, their officers, representatives, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all members and persons acting in concert or participation with them, be enjoined and restrained from the commission, continuation, or repetition of the acts and conduct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j) through (o), above, acts or conduct in furtherance or support thereof, or like or related acts or conduct, the commission of which in the future is likely or may fairly be anticipated from Respondent's acts and conduct in the past.
The only subject requiring extended comment by this Court is the factual contention raised by the Council and Local 30, namely, that the object of the picketing here in question was not to force the assignment of work to Local 30 or to force Wheeler to recognize Local 30. Rather, the Union contends that the object of the picketing was to protest Wheeler's payment of wages below those prevailing for the roofing industry in the Eastern Pennsylvania area. In discussing whether this Court has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred both the § 8(b) (4) (i) (ii) (D) and the § 8(b) (7) (A) claims can be considered together.
§ 8(b) (4) (D) as quoted above, by its own terms, prohibits all strike conduct or any threats, coercion or restraint where the object is the proscribed one of forcing the assignment of work to another union, i.e., a jurisdictional dispute. Shore v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 316 F. Supp. 426, 431 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Thus, an employer should be free to make work assignments as in this case and choose a subcontractor whose employees are members of another union without being subjected to pressure from another labor organization. Here, there was ample evidence presented at the hearings to indicate that the object of picketing was to force the assignment of the work in question to Local 30. There was evidence of threats (N.T., (9/14/72) pp. 12, 19, 25, 26, 32); violence (N.T., (9/14/72) p. 19); blockage of access to the plant (N.T., (9/14/72) p. 37). On the other hand, there was no evidence that any of the pickets mentioned the alleged protest over Wheeler's failure to pay the area wage rates. (N.T., 35, 36, 41). A viewing of the picket line would disclose that while the pickets' signs indicated that the nature of the protest was over area wage rates, the acts of the pickets, as indicated above, are consistent with a finding that at least one of the pickets' objectives was to force the assignment of work to Local 30.
Further, counsel for the Respondent Council and Local 30, Bernard N. Katz, Esquire, when asked by the President of Wheeler how the picket line could be removed was told by Katz that the "quick, simple way" was to sign an "assent agreement" with Local 30 and use Local 30 people to finish the job. (N.T., (9/19/72), pp. 21, 36-38, 62.) Thus, the pickets own attorney admitted that the signing of an agreement with Local 30 would end the picketing.
Thus, one of the effects and objects of the picketing was to accomplish by threats and coercion -- and by picketing -- the assignment of work to Local 30 and away from Wheeler's duly recognized union, District 50. However, a subsidiary objective here might be informational, telling Wheeler's employees and the public of Wheeler's failure to observe area wage standards. But, where at least one of the objects of the picketing was that proscribed by statute, the picketing should and must be enjoined. E.g., Samoff v. Teamsters Local 115, 338 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Samoff v. Keystone District Council of Carpenters, 320 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Samoff v. Building & Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia, 236 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See also, Schauffler v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Assoc., 292 F.2d 182, 188 (3rd Cir. 1961); Schauffler v. United Assoc. of Journeymen, etc., 218 F.2d 476 (3rd Cir. 1955).
The record of the instant case makes demonstrably clear that the defendants in their conduct are not gentle people. Their threats of violence have been instantaneous and unrestrained; by their strategy and their conversations even the strong-hearted would have been intimidated and coerced. One member of the United Steel Workers Union and an employee of Bethlehem, who wore a hearing aid and glasses, James Angstadt, attempted to cross the picket line and go to work when the following attack occurred:
"Then he got off my car and I pulled forward and went up to work. Then one of the men came around to the car, my window was down, and punched me in the mouth, . . ." (N.T., (9/14/72) p. 19).
Another incident involved Mr. N. L. Young, a salesman for Parent Metal Products Company of Philadelphia, who, upon arriving at the picket line on July 24, 1972, was threatened as follows:
"Well, what are you some f . . . ing scab?"