mask and dark coat justified admission of those exhibits into evidence. The weight to be given this evidence was for the jury.
The defendants contend that the court erred in permitting the eye-witness in-court identification of Lewis Isenberg by Clara Campbell. We presume that the basis for this contention is the confrontation which occurred between Clara Campbell and Lewis Isenberg in court at the suppression hearing held the day before the commencement of the trial. On behalf of Lewis, it was argued that since Mrs. Campbell observed Lewis in the courtroom at the counsel table during the suppression hearing, any inicourt identification she might make would be tainted and inadmissible.
A Wade hearing was held on this issue at which evidence was presented. From this evidence the court found as a fact that Clara Campbell's presence at the suppression hearing was not an intentional confrontation arranged by the prosecution and that, in any event, her in-court testimony was not tainted as a result of this confrontation. It was established to the satisfaction of the court by clear and convincing testimony that Mrs. Campbell's in-court identification of Lewis Isenberg stemmed from an independent source, namely, her observation of him at the bank when he robbed her. Counsel for Lewis Isenberg, who was in court at the suppression hearing, cross-examined Mrs. Campbell on this issue at the Wade hearing and at the trial. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); United States v. Carney, 455 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Furtney, 454 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Hardy, 451 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1971). No reason was advanced by counsel for Lewis Isenberg at argument as to why these findings should be changed. We think this ground for a new trial is without merit.
Finally, the defendants argue that the court erred in summarizing the prosecution's evidence at length when the defendants did not take the witness stand and presented no evidence. We disagree with the defendants' contention in this regard. The fact that a defendant produces less evidence than the prosecution, or no evidence at all, does not relieve a trial judge of his duty to assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion by summarizing the evidence. Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 879 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dalli, 424 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Dockery, 417 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1969).
An appropriate order will be entered.