Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, in case of City of Pittsburgh, a municipal corporation, v. The Ellis School, a Pennsylvania, nonprofit corporation, and Alexander Haverstick, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of The Ellis School, No. S.A. 234 of 1970.
M. C. McLean, with him J. N. Poffinberger, Jr., and Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchison, for appellants.
Eugene B. Strassburger, III, Executive Assistant City Solicitor, for appellee.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Opinion by Judge Wilkinson.
This was an action that was started by a complaint being filed by the City of Pittsburgh in the Housing Court of Pittsburgh against The Ellis School and the Chairman of its Board of Trustees for violation of the Zoning Ordinance, being Ordinance No. 192 of 1958, as amended and supplemented. The judgment of the Housing Court Magistrate held that the defendants were in violation of the Zoning Ordinance.
Appellants then took an appeal de novo under Section 3 of the Minor Judiciary Court Appeals Act, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. (No. 355), 42 P.S. § 3003, to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, where the facts were stipulated and were substantially the facts as alleged in the complaint. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County adjudged the appellants guilty and this appeal followed. We must affirm.
The appellants have confused the right of The Ellis School to construct the driveway here involved and the method it must use to exercise that right. The principal cases relied on by appellants to establish the right to construct this driveway, Rolling Green Golf Club Case, 374 Pa. 450, 97 A.2d 523 (1953), Young Men & Page 596} Women's Hebrew Association v. Monroeville Borough Council, 429 Pa. 283, 240 A.2d 469 (1968), and Taged Incorporated, a Corporation and Thomas G. Zaimes, an Individual v. The Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Monroeville, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 52, 276 A.2d 845 (1971), were all appeals in cases that had their origin in actions initiated by applications to zoning authorities for permission to construct driveways, and were concluded by the Supreme Court and this Court directing the zoning authorities to grant permission. In the case before us, appellants assert that the right to construct the driveway is beyond the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance. We cannot agree.
The Ellis School is located in an "R-4" residential zone. Authority to construct and operate the School was secured as a conditional use by following the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance which, among other things, required the submission and approval of a site plan showing the details of the "land in relationship to its surroundings, including details of land, topography, landscaping and structures." To construct the driveway in question, The Ellis School acquired an adjoining lot into which Kentucky Avenue "dead ended."*fn1 The City takes the position that The Ellis School was in violation of the Zoning Ordinance in two respects, either of which would be sufficient to sustain the conviction. First, the City says that the altering of the driveway, removal of shrubbery, and removal of the fence constituted an alteration of the site plan as originally approved by City Council and requires approval
under the Zoning Ordinance. Second, the extension of the driveway over the after-acquired adjoining lot constituted a use of that lot for school purposes which would require approval of City Council. The lower court agreed with both points. We find it necessary only to agree with the first.
The distinction is important, for the procedure to obtain approval should the School elect to seek approval to use the new driveway would be different. The Zoning Ordinance was amended in 1966 with Section 2801-2-A (25), wherein the Zoning Administrator was given authority to approve alterations in the site plan which would not require City Council action under Section 2801-1-C if the alteration did not affect student capacity. Certainly it was not successfully argued before this Court that the rerouting of internal traffic, removing shrubbery and removing a fence ...