plaintiff for the damage resulting from such illegal work stoppages.
Conclusions of Law
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of this proceeding under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, § 301; 29 U.S.C. § 185.
2. Plaintiff is an employer and is engaged in commerce or industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act.
3. Defendants International, District #2, and Local Nos. 1386, 1368, 6359, 6394, and 6411, are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
4. Defendants International, District #2, and Local Nos. 1386, 1368, 6359, 6394, and 6411, are the collective bargaining representative of plaintiff's hourly-paid production and maintenance workers.
5. The Norris-LaGuardia Act has no application to this case because of the existence of a local dispute subject to arbitration.
6. Industrial peace requires a prompt resolution of disputes.
7. The November 22, 1971 strike at plaintiff's Cambria Division was a local dispute or difference of the kind which all parties were contractually obligated to resolve under the terms of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971, and, in particular, the section denominated Article XVII, "Settlement of Disputes" (1971).
8. The contract precludes strikes under Article XX, Maintain Integrity of Agreement. Accordingly, the defendant Unions' resort to strikes and work stoppages was, and is, in violation of contract, cf. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 259 F.2d 346, as aff'd as to this issue, 361 U.S. 459, 464, 80 S. Ct. 489, 4 L. Ed. 2d 442; Local 174 et al. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593, 82 S. Ct. 571; Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union of Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 2d 199, 90 S. Ct. 1583; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972, 77 S. Ct. 912; Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMW, 436 F.2d 551, 76 LRRM 2003 (6th Cir. 1970).
9. All strikes which have occurred at plaintiff's Cambria Division during the course of the current and preceding collective bargaining agreements arose out of local disputes or differences of the kind which the parties were contractually obliged to settle under the grievance machinery provided in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements of 1968, and 1971.
10. Because this strike and strikes and work stoppages of this character cause immediate and irreparable harm and injury, loss and damage to the plaintiff, and for the additional reason that the Court believes that breaches of the contract by the Unions will continue unless an injunction is issued, the Court is of the opinion that an injunction is appropriate in the premises, despite the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, cf. The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union of Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 2d 199, 90 S. Ct. 1583 (1970); Mitchell v. Speller, 24 CCH Labor Cases P67,916; Schauffler v. United Association of Journeymen, 218 F.2d 476 (3rd Cir. 1955); Schauffler v. Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 107, 230 F.2d 7 (3rd. Cir. 1956); Sperry v. Building Material and Construction, 149 F. Supp. 243 (8th Cir. 1957); Greene v. Bangor Building Trades Council, 165 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. ME 1958); Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local Union No. 1487 of the United Mine Workers of America, Cv. No. 70-155- D, 68 Lab. Cas. (CCH)P12,591 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
11. Since defendants are unwilling to voluntarily implement internal methods of preventing work stoppages, federal labor policy favoring labor peace requires the issuance of a permanent injunction to guarantee their compliance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
12. The defendant Unions and their officers are responsible for the mass action of their members. New Power Wire and Electric Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1965); Teamsters v. Hum Ko Co., 287 F.2d 231, 42 LC P16,780 (5th Cir. 1961); United Textile Workers v. Newberry Mills, 238 F. Supp. 366 (W.D.S.C. 1965); U.S. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 96 F. Supp. 428 (D. Ill. 1951); United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.C. 1948), cert. den. 85 U.S. App. D.C. 149, 177 F.2d 29.
13. Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm and injury and will continue to suffer irreparable harm and injury as a result of the violation of the 1971 Labor Agreement by the defendant Unions and their members. An award of damages cannot possibly compensate plaintiff for the loss of coal production resulting from these work stoppages or strikes.
14. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the refusal of the defendant Unions and their members to utilize the procedures to which the parties agreed for settling differences or disputes.
15. Greater injury will be suffered by the plaintiff from the denial of a Preliminary Injunction than will be suffered by the defendant Unions and their members from its issuance.
16. From the evidence as presented, there is reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed at the final hearing on the merits of the case.
Defendants principal argument has been that this work stoppage did not arise out of a matter which was subject to the grievance procedure. The evidence leads me to a contrary conclusion. At pages 50, 51, 52, and 53 of the transcript of testimony at the hearing of November 24, 1971, Owen F. Slagle, Sr., President of District No. 2, UMWA, which includes all the defendant local unions explained at length that the prime objection of the members was the provision as to starting time, which was a dispute still pending unresolved by the arbitrator to whom a prior grievance on this subject had been submitted after this court had enjoined a prior work stoppage. The terms of the 1971 contract affirmed the employer's position on this prior dispute. Mr. Slagle was of the opinion that the provisions of the 1971 contract on this subject were "quite ambiguous".
"I could interpret it one way, and I think the company could the other. Because starting time is in the realm of being ambiguous, and there has been a squabble over there, as I think you know." (Tr. pp. 50, 51 -- 11/24/71).