TROUTMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff, a longshoreman, instituted this action against defendant shipowner to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of defendant's: (1) negligence and (2) breach of warranty of seaworthiness. Presently before the Court is defendant's motion for reconsideration of its prior motion for summary judgment, 326 F. Supp. 226. Upon reviewing the record, we find no disputed issue as to the material facts which are as follows:
Plaintiff, Lewis McNeil, is a longshoreman employed by third-party defendant, independent Pier Company. He was so employed on September 29, 1967, at Pier 55 South Wharves, Philadelphia, where defendant's ship, the A/S HAVBOR was berthed. Plaintiff's injuries occurred when the "squeeze lift" truck he was operating struck an undetermined object on the pier shed floor. The impact caused the steering wheel to spin, and a knob attached thereto struck and injured plaintiff's wrist.
Plaintiff's job in the longshoring gang was to operate the squeeze lift truck, which was owned by plaintiff's employer and supervisor, Independent Pier Company. His specific responsibility in the operation was to lift and transfer certain cases from pallets owned by Independent Pier Company to pallets owned by defendant. Thereafter, other longshoremen in the same gang would use forklifts to transfer these pallets from the pier to the ship's side, where they would be lifted aboard by the ship's tackle. During the course of his employment, plaintiff did not go aboard defendant's vessel and operated solely within the confines of a marine terminal.
Initially, plaintiff concedes that he cannot prove that his injuries were caused by defendant's negligence, thus, our sole concern is with the issue of seaworthiness. In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 92 S. Ct. 418, 30 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1971) the Supreme Court held that a longshoreman who suffers injury while transferring cargo by a pier-based forklift on a pier to a point alongside a vessel for loading was neither injured "upon the high seas or navigable waters" within the traditional maritime meaning nor injured "by a vessel on navigable waters" within the scope of the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948. Thus, the Court refused to extend the warranty of seaworthiness shoreward for injuries sustained by a longshoreman on land merely because he was engaged in the process of "loading" or "unloading". See Cannida v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 452 F.2d 949 (3rd Cir., December 28, 1971). The facts of the instant case are strikingly similar to those in Law, where the court enumerated the operative factors to determine the existence of maritime jurisdiction:
"In the present case, however, the typical elements of a maritime cause of action are particularly attenuated: respondent Law was not injured by equipment which was part of the ship's usual gear or which was stored on board, the equipment which injured him was in no way attached to the ship, the forklift was not under the control of the ship or its crew, and the accident did not occur aboard ship or on the gangplank." 404 U.S. at 213, 92 S. Ct. at 462.