Willson, Senior District Judge.
In the complaint as filed the plaintiff, Jamestown Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaratory judgment to settle a controversy between it and Erie Insurance Exchange, the defendant. Erie filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that there was no actual controversy between the parties.
On March 4, 1968, Jamestown had executed its automobile insurance policy to one Ralph W. Lyons indemnifying him among other things against the usual liability for damages to persons and property resulting from the ownership, maintenance and use of a 1964 Buick automobile, a copy of plaintiff's policy being attached to the complaint.
On September 25, 1968, Lyons had taken his Buick Sedan to the Dillaman Brothers Body Shop in Meadville in this District for the purpose of having it repaired. Dillaman loaned Lyons a 1960 Chrysler Sedan to drive until the repairs on his car were completed. Dillaman was insured by the defendant, Erie Insurance Exchange, under its pioneer combination garage policy, a copy of which is attached to the complaint and marked Exhibit B.
On October 2, 1968, Lyons was driving the Dillaman Chrysler in the City of Meadville and was involved in an accident as a result of which he was sued in the Common Pleas Court of Crawford County, Pennsylvania by Lucille Lindsey and John E. Lindsey, her husband.
The Lindsey suit against Lyons was pending only at No. 148 September Term 1970 in the state court when the argument on the motion to dismiss was heard. Thereafter a stipulation, which is a part of this record, was entered into by the parties to this case pursuant to which Jamestown undertook to defend Lyons without waiving any rights against Erie. Jamestown engaged counsel to defend Lyons in the Lindsey suit in the state court. That suit now has been concluded, and Jamestown has paid out a total sum of $12,191.95 in behalf of Lyons which includes the amount of the Lindsey settlement, plus counsel fees, and various costs.
In the amended complaint Jamestown alleges that Erie had the primary responsibility to indemnify Lyons on the Lindsey claim and as plaintiff has discharged this obligation, as it agreed to do in the stipulation, it seeks recovery from Erie in the amount that it has paid, the result being, of course, that there is now an actual controversy between these parties.
The case is now before me on motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by each of the parties hereto.
Under the motions and the undisputed facts, this Court must determine which of the two insurance companies provided coverage to Lyons while he was driving the garage car which had been loaned to him while his Buick car was being repaired. This is an issue which arises rather frequently of late. It seems that insurance companies are indefatigable in devising language which excludes coverage rather than accepts it in these situations. For instance in this case each company says the exclusion language in its policy puts coverage on the other company. In this case the law of Pennsylvania applies under the diversity rule, as both companies do business in this District, and the policies were delivered here, and the accident occurred here. The issue is even more perplexing than usual in this instance because both counsel agree that there are no Pennsylvania Appellate Court decisions which rule on the point at issue.
The Jamestown policy contains what is commonly known as an "excess clause," whereas the Erie policy contains the provision which is commonly known as an "escape clause" or a "no liability clause." The policy which Lyons had with the plaintiff, Jamestown, for his personally-owned vehicle, contained a paragraph titled "OTHER INSURANCE," which provided as follows:
"Provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile, or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance."
The pertinent provision of the Erie policy is found on page 3 of the Pioneer policy under the Section titled "PERSONS INSURED." Section A 2(e) reads as follows:
"None of the following is an Insured under coverage A -- bodily injury, liability and coverage B -- property damage, liability: any person other than the named Insured, if such person has available to him any other valid and collectible automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess, with limits of liability at least equal to the minimum limits specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which the automobile is principally garage."