NEALON, District Judge.
Defendants have been indicted for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (use of interstate telephone facilities with the intent to carry on an unlawful activity), and 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (use of a telephone for the transmission in interstate commerce of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on sporting events or contests), and have filed a motion to suppress, challenging the validity of the wiretap authorization under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Numerous contentions have been raised by Defendants in support of the motion but this Memorandum will be confined to the allegations that the Government failed to comply with the requirements of Section 2516(1) of the Act, 18 U.S.C., viz.; that neither the Attorney General nor any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him authorized the application to this Court for an order allowing the interception of wire communications on telephones listed in the names of Defendants Al Baldassari and Joe O. Baldassari.
A reading of Title III and its legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to prohibit all wiretapping and electronic surveillance except by law enforcement officials investigating certain enumerated crimes and under a carefully circumscribed and strictly controlled procedure. The legislative history further states specifically that the procedure was intended to conform to the constitutional standards enunciated in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
In Berger, supra, the Supreme Court expressed the deepest concern toward electronic eavesdropping, describing it as, by its very nature, ". . . an intrusion of privacy that is broad in scope," and observed that ". . . [few] threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices." Id. 388 U.S. at 56, 63, 87 S. Ct. at 1885. Insofar as Fourth Amendment rights were concerned, Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, suggested that ". . . a showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice would appear more important in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized." Id. at 60, 87 S. Ct. at 1884. And Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, stated that the affidavit submitted to the Court showing probable cause ". . . might be enough to satisfy the standards of the Fourth Amendment for a conventional search or arrest, . . . [but] . . . it was constitutionally insufficient to constitute probable cause to justify an intrusion of the scope and duration that was permitted in this case." Id. at 70, 87 S. Ct. at 1889. Similarly in Katz, supra, the Court referred to ". . . the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment," and held such a procedure ". . . to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case." Id. 389 U.S. at 359, 88 S. Ct. at 515. Against this backdrop of judicial awareness of the awesome potential for abuse, and concern for individual privacy, Title III was debated and enacted. That it intended to establish a stringent step by step procedure leading up to ultimate judicial authorization for the use of electronic eavesdropping equipment is clear.
Section 2516(1) provides, inter alia:
"The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal Judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications. . . ."
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
Senate Report No. 1097, 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2185 explains the legislative purpose behind section 2516(1), as follows:
"This provision centralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility that divergent practices might develop. Should abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision in itself should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses will happen."