TROUTMAN, District Judge.
This action, brought against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, pursuant to Section 1869(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b), seeks to review a final decision of the Secretary, denying the plaintiff the payment of benefits for services provided to him, Maurice C. Johnson, as an in-patient at the Haverford Nursing Center, during a portion of the period May 19, 1969, through July 7, 1969.
Judicial review is governed by the provisions of Section 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides, inter alia, "the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive * * *".
This Court has no authority to hear the case de novo. Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Mauldin v. Celebrezze, 260 F. Supp. 287 (D.C.S.C. 1966).
Therefore, the question here involved is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision. To answer this question, it is the duty of this Court to look at the record as a whole. Boyd v. Folsom, 257 F.2d 778 (3rd Cir. 1958); Klimaszewski v. Flemming, 176 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
"Substantial evidence" has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938). It "must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established", NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S. Ct. 501, 505, 83 L. Ed. 660. It must be enough, if the trial were to a jury, to justify a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusions sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. If there is only a slight preponderance of the evidence on one side or the other, the Secretary's findings should be affirmed. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850, 851 (4th Cir. 1962).
Section 1862 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y, lists a number of "exclusions from coverage". Among others, there is Section 1862(a)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(9), which provides for an exclusion "where such expenses are for custodial care". Basing its decision upon such exclusion, the appeals council concluded, inter alia, as follows:
"In summary, the medical evidence of record indicates that the claimant was ill while at the Haverford General Hospital and that a period of restorative care might have been necessary immediately after discharge from the hospital. However, it does not show that at any time during the period at issue, that is, from June 1 to July 7, 1969, the claimant needed and received skilled nursing care on a continuing basis for any condition or conditions with respect to which he was receiving inpatient hospital services prior to entering the Haverford Nursing Center or for a condition which arose while receiving extended care for treatment of the original condition.