TEITELBAUM, District Judge.
On April 23, 1971, the defendant Belmont Keresty was convicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 892,
one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 894,
and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952,
and the defendant Thomas Earl Phillips was convicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 894. Both defendants have moved for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial. Between them the defendants assign as reasons in support of their motions the following: (1) a violation of the Extortionate Extension of Credit Act
was not established, (2) if a violation was established, the Act is unconstitutional, (3) the Court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the gambling laws of Pennsylvania was erroneous, (4) the Court's instruction to the jury as to the participation by the defendant Phillips was erroneous, and (5) the evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury.
Factually, of course, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). In that light the testimony clearly establishes the commissions of the crimes with which the defendants were charged. On August 18, 1969, the defendant Keresty and one Louis Capo engaged in a dice game. Whether or not the game was for fun or for real was contested, but is substantively unimportant. At the conclusion of the game, Keresty indicated to Capo that he would return the following day to collect his winnings. The next day he returned and demanded $8,000.00 from Capo, assertedly the amount which he understood he had won. Capo disputed the claim and told Keresty that the game had been for fun and that in any event he didn't have that kind of money. Keresty told Capo that he would have to get the money somewhere. Apparently no threats of violence were made at the time of this exchange.
However, Keresty persisted in his demand, and when Capo failed to satisfy the claim, Keresty enlisted the aid of the defendant Phillips. At the least, Phillips' role was to stand silently and intimidatingly by, while Keresty represented Phillips to Capo as "Tony" from the "syndicate" and threatened Capo with physical harm if the money wasn't promptly paid. The payment of the debt was continually deferred to allow Capo to come up with the money until finally, the threat overhanging, Capo settled with Keresty for $2,000.00.
Section 891 of the Act defines extension of credit to mean,
"* * * to make or renew any loan, or to enter into any agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or claim, whether acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, and however arising, may or will be deferred."
This broad definition explicitly embraces the instant tacit agreements between Keresty and Capo whereby the satisfaction of Keresty's disputed claim was deferred. Thus a violation of § 892 was established. Nor is it doubted that the evidence established a violation by both Keresty and Phillips of § 894.
The defendants argue that the instant application of §§ 892 and 894 is unreasonably literal. They argue that the Act was intended to make unlawful those activities colloquially classified as "loan-sharking". The language which structures the Act, however, is clear and precise. If it is broad, it is broad for the purpose of assuring that its application is not limited to traditional conceptions. It proscribes specific rather than generic activities. And it is the specific activities with which Keresty and Phillips were charged which were within its proscriptions, however unconventional.
Alternatively, the defendants argue that if the activities established by the evidence are within the proscriptions of the Act, it is unconstitutionally broad absent a showing that those particular activities affect interstate commerce. In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct. 1357, 28 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1971), the Supreme Court confronted and rejected that very argument. There, the Court held, (1) that since Congress may judge a purely intrastate extortionate credit transaction to affect interstate commerce, the Act was within the province of Federal power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and (2) quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968), that,
"[Where] the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." (Emphasis in original)