Appeal from judgment of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, Dec. T., 1968, No. 1376, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Benjamin Hill, Jr.
Michael C. Richman, with him Steinberg, Greenstein, Richman & Price, for appellant.
Mark Sendrow, Assistant District Attorney, with him Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, James D. Crawford, Deputy District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien and Pomeroy, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Justice Pomeroy. Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In 1968 appellant was arrested for the homicide of one Leslie Mae Davis. He was charged under indictments for murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. He was tried by a jury and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Post-trial motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were
denied, and appellant was sentenced to four to twelve years in a state correctional institution. This appeal followed.
Appellant asserts that the inculpatory statement which was introduced into evidence against him was involuntary and that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that neither of these contentions is meritorious.
A Jackson-Denno hearing to test the voluntariness of appellant's statement was held out of the presence of the jury. It was appellant's position that at the time he made his statement he was still suffering from a gunshot wound; that the investigators promised he could lie down if he made a statement; and that he was not emotionally and physically capable of making the statements attributed to him. The testimony taken at the suppression hearing showed that at 11:00 A.M. on October 30, 1968, appellant was released from the detective ward of a Philadelphia hospital where he had been under medical care for over one week for a gunshot wound; that appellant was physically and mentally able to travel; that he was taken immediately to the police station and there given his Miranda warnings; that he began making a formal statement at 2:30 P.M. and that the statement was completed, after two rest breaks, at 4:25 P.M.; and that his speech was at all times intelligent and coherent. A review of the record convinces us that the trial judge was correct in determining that appellant's statement was voluntary and admissible. Appellant was intelligent, apparently possessed of all his faculties, and not laboring under difficulties of the sort that the accused were in either Commonwealth v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968), or Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 171, 220 A.2d 628 (1966). He was twenty-five years old at the time he gave his statement, had
completed eleven years of formal schooling, and had served at one time as a security guard.
Appellant's second contention, viz., that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, is conceded by the Commonwealth in its brief. The Commonwealth argues, however, that ample evidence was introduced to support a conviction of murder, and that in such a situation the jury in its discretion could return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. That this is within the power of the jury is beyond cavil. As we said recently in Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 266 A.2d 726 (1970), "Few propositions are better established in the criminal law than the doctrine that where the evidence would be sufficient to support a conviction ...