Appeal from order of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, Oct. T., 1960, Nos. 279 to 283, inclusive, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gettis Riley.
Michael F. Walsh, for appellant.
Peter S. Greenberg and Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorneys, James D. Crawford, Deputy District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Bell, C. J., Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy and Barbieri, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Bell. Mr. Justice Roberts concurs in the result.
On March 19, 1962, appellant, represented by Court-appointed counsel, entered pleas of guilty to murder generally on two bills of indictment. A Court en banc heard three days of testimony and, after arguments, adjudged appellant guilty of first-degree murder on each bill and sentenced him to life imprisonment on each bill. No appeal was taken from either judgment of sentence.
Appellant filed a habeas corpus petition on January 14, 1964, which, after hearing, was dismissed. At this
hearing, appellant was not represented by counsel. On appeal to our Court, we affirmed: Commonwealth ex rel. Riley v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 168, 210 A.2d 270.
A habeas corpus petition was filed in the U. S. District Court on November 3, 1967. In that proceeding, appellant raised five contentions, which he repeats in his present appeal. After a hearing, that petition was denied. Appellant was represented by counsel at the Federal habeas corpus hearing.
On December 31, 1968, appellant filed a Post Conviction Hearing Act petition,*fn* which, after hearing, was denied. This denial was based upon the above-mentioned (State) habeas corpus petition. On appeal to our Court, we remanded the case to the lower Court. On May 4, 1970, a hearing on the PCHA petition was held and the petition was denied. Appellant was represented by counsel at said hearing. From the denial of the PCHA petition, appellant took this appeal.
Appellant's principal contention in this appeal, in which he was represented by counsel, is a repetition of one of his former contentions, namely, that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered.
Appellant points out that at the time his guilty plea was entered, no on-the-record colloquy took place. Even though he was represented by counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea, the fact that no on-the-record colloquy took place would be in violation of the present requirements for the acceptance of a guilty plea. See Rule 319 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238. However, the guilty plea in this case was entered pre-Boykin, and we have held Boykin ...