working clothes, were in the immediate area. As Bond passed, Jones and another agent approached him from the side, each took hold of one of his wrists and another agent patted him down, reaching under his open jacket. They found a firearm in a holster in his belt at the center of his back. Bond was then told he was under arrest. Immediately upon being advised that he was under arrest and before any warning of any kind was given to him, Bond volunteered "You better get my suitcase off that plane, it has weapons in it."
Bond was then taken to a police car where Agent Jones advised him of his rights. After being advised of his rights, Bond identified himself as Stanley Ray Bond and stated that he did not need an attorney nor did he want one and that he understood his rights. During the trip from the airport to the police station, Bond talked about bank robberies with which Jones was not familiar. Bond stated that he carried the gun for protection.
On arrival at the police station, Bond's bag was searched, after which he was booked and placed in a cell. Later that day, Agent Jones spoke to Bond, read to him the FBI advice of rights form, and asked him to read it. Bond did so and in response to Jones' inquiry, Bond replied that he understood his rights. He refused, however, to sign the advice of rights form containing a waiver. Thereafter, fully aware of his rights, Bond voluntarily spoke to Agent Jones and made certain statements to him concerning crimes unrelated to the Bell robbery.
On the next morning, September 28, 1970, Bond was taken before a United States Commissioner. He was advised of his rights by the Commissioner. Thereafter, he was again interviewed by Agent Jones. Again the advice of rights form was read to Bond and read by Bond. He indicated again he understood what his rights were but refused to sign the form containing the waiver. Notwithstanding his refusal to sign, he thereafter voluntarily, with full understanding of his rights, spoke to Agent Jones and in response to a question whether he had been involved in a recent bank robbery in Philadelphia, answered "that was more practice" and that he "made a molotov cocktail," giving some details as to how he had made it.
The motion to suppress the statements was denied because the court was satisfied and found that the statements were voluntarily made after Bond had been fully informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and that he intelligently and knowingly waived his rights in making the statements to Agent Jones.
The court also found and concluded that the information which Agent Jones had obtained from his questioning of the airport manager and the woman, considered in light of his experience as an agent, at the very least furnished reasonable grounds for further investigation to determine whether, in fact, the male person referred to was carrying a firearm aboard an aircraft, in violation of the laws of the United States (49 U.S.C. § 1472(l)). Agent Jones' action in requesting the return of the aircraft to ascertain whether firearms were being carried on the aircraft was a proper measure, under the emergency circumstances, to insure the safety of the passengers aboard the craft. The degree of force exerted when the suspect left the plane (the seizing of the wrists) was reasonable and was the minimum necessary for the conduct of a safe frisk for a firearm. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970). Discovery of the firearm furnished ample ground for the arrest which was then made.
Although not necessary to the court's decision, the court also concluded that the information (hereinabove recounted) which had been obtained by Agent Jones was reliable information furnishing probable cause to believe that a bank robbery had been committed and that the person referred to by the witnesses was the person who had committed it. This, in the opinion of the court, would have justified an immediate arrest without a warrant, at the moment the defendant left the plane, even before the frisk was made and the firearm discovered. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967).