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ANDERSON v. KING KUP CANDIES (09/20/71)

decided: September 20, 1971.

ANDERSON
v.
KING KUP CANDIES, INC.



Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County at No. 156 March Term, 1970, in the case of Richard Anderson v. King Kup Candies, Inc.

COUNSEL

Leonard J. Gajewski, for appellant.

Joseph E. Lewis, with him Stevens & Lee, for appellee.

Judges Crumlish, Jr., Manderino and Mencer, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Manderino.

Author: Manderino

[ 3 Pa. Commw. Page 228]

Richard Anderson, appellant, was denied compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Board and the Board's decision was upheld by the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County. Anderson appeals to this court pursuant to Section 508(d) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 (Act No. 223 of July 31, 1970, P.L. , 17 P.S. 211.101 et seq.)

The lower court upheld the Board's decision based on the Board's conclusions that there was no "accident" and also that no causal connection had been established between the incident (which the Board said was not an accident) and Anderson's injuries.

Anderson claims that the record clearly sustains a finding that an "accident" occurred in the course of his employment and also that the record clearly sustains a causal connection between the alleged "accident" and Anderson's injuries. We conclude that the lower court properly affirmed the decision of the Board. The question before this court is whether the findings of the Board and its conclusions of law can be sustained without a capricious disregard of competent evidence. Doheny v. City Stores, 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 566, 193 A.2d 650 (1963).

The Board found that no "accident" had occurred because the incident was routine and regularly occurred in the course of Anderson's employment. Anderson while pushing a truck off an elevator was jerked back because the level of the floor was higher than that of the elevator. The Board concluded that the jerking back which occurred was not unusual in degree or kind from what normally occurred when Anderson pushed the truck off the elevator which he did daily in his employment. The elevator worked properly but when the truck was placed upon the elevator, the weight of the truck would cause the elevator to be depressed slightly and a

[ 3 Pa. Commw. Page 229]

    certain amount of pressure was needed in order to push the truck off the elevator onto the floor. The Board's conclusion that this did not constitute an accident is sustained and controlled by Crispin v. Leedom & Worrall Company, 341 Pa. 325, 19 A.2d 400 (1941). The Crispin case is identical to this case on the question of whether an accident occurred:

The facts in Crispin were: "Claimant . . . was engaged . . . in pushing from an electric elevator a truck. . . . Because of the weight of the truck . . . the elevator . . . came to rest . . . an inch to an inch and a half below the floor level of the storeroom. . . . The two men were unsuccessful in their first attempt to push the truck over this elevation, but by a second, stronger effort they moved it from the elevator with a 'bounce.' Neither the disparity between the floor levels nor the effort required to overcome it ...


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