to and authorized by his superiors. Thus he would have been within required "space limits" in so acting. Because Gilg's presence was required at various conferences and conventions, the view of this Court is that he was engaging in the kind of work for which he was employed and it was actuated by a desire to serve the government, at least in part. Even though the cut-off time on his travel voucher was recorded as terminating at 6:30 P.M., September 10, 1968, and the accident took place some three hours thereafter, he was in fact pursuing the interests of the government by mailing his letter of complaint to the hotel. Moreover, the fact that Gilg also intended to purchase a magazine on his trip or that he had had dinner interspersed between his business endeavors does not vitiate the agency relationship or the fact that he was acting within the scope of his employment. Anzenberger v. Nickols, supra.
It appears appropriate to point out that counsel have stipulated as a fact that the Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees Compensation made complete payment to the estate and family of Gilg of all benefits which an employee of the United States would be entitled if the employee died while engaged in government business. In addition, certain records, reports, and correspondence indicate that the position taken by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employee Compensation, and the United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration, is that Gilg clearly was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. These reports were prepared by both federal agencies subsequent to Gilg's death to determine eligibility for employee benefits. Records so prepared are properly admissible in evidence. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950). Moreover, the Court takes the view that these reports and records were prepared in the ordinary course of business of these federal agencies and thus were admissible under the Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 et seq. The significance of these reports is that the federal agencies concluded that the estate and family of Gilg were entitled to benefits because Gilg was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. It is not only inconsistent but illogical for the government to assert that Gilg was within the scope of his employment for purposes of compensation benefits, yet to deny the same to avoid liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The evidence has established that the plaintiff sustained severe injuries as a result of the accident. These include headaches, blurred vision, cerebral concussion, and a flexor extensor injury of the cervical spine. All of these have caused great pain, suffering and inconvenience. As a result of these accident-related injuries, plaintiff has received extensive medical treatment, medication, hospitalization, and physiotherapy. Such treatment will be required indefinitely in the future. There has been a substantial loss of wages, impairment of earning power, and property damage to the plaintiff's tractor trailer. Total special damages have been sustained in an amount in excess of $13,000. Damages will therefore be awarded for the special damages, medical care and attention required in the future, pain, suffering and inconvenience, past, present and future, and impairment of earning power reduced to present worth.
As specifically authorized by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has not separately stated its findings of fact and conclusions of law; the same are contained in the body of the foregoing opinion.
An appropriate order is entered.
AND, NOW, this 20 day of August 1971, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, Charles S. Kemerer, and against the defendant, the United States of America, in the amount of $40,000.00.
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