The opinion of the court was delivered by: BODY
Steven Louis Shelly was indicted on April 16, 1970 for refusing to report for induction into the armed forces in violation of the Selective Service Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 462. Defendant has filed three motions with this Court; we will dispose of them in the following order:
(1) Motion to dismiss the indictment
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars
We do not doubt the force of registrant's substantive argument concerning the effect of the Scott decision to the facts of this case. See United States v. Stephens, 445 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104, (3d Cir. 1971). But we do feel bound by the prior decisions in this district that have held that such matters are not open to this Court's consideration on a motion to dismiss. United States v. Winer, 323 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa., 1971); United States v. Zickler, Crim. No. 70-234 (E.D. Pa., January 11, 1971).
Registrant cites several cases to support his argument that procedural matters can be considered on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 306 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Haffner, 301 F. Supp. 828 (D. Hawaii 1969); United States v. Seeley, 401 F. Supp. 811 (D.R.I. 1969). Clearly the most persuasive of these cases is Seeley, where Judge Pettine has carefully discussed the use of the motion to dismiss in Selective Service prosecutions. He concludes that:
The breadth of Rule 12(b)(1) permits a motion to dismiss a 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 462(a) indictment to be made, as a procedural matter, to the Court when the defendant is attacking the classification process. Such a ruling is in my view a time-saving and fair procedure which admirably comports with the function of the courts in reviewing Selective Service System decision-making.
301 F. Supp. 811, 813. We must note, however, that the impact of this opinion was considerably weakened by the First Circuit decision in United States v. Ramos, 413 F.2d 743 (1969). In Ramos, decided after Seeley, the Court of Appeals noted that questions concerning the validity of appellant's classification should have been raised as a defense at trial rather than by a motion to dismiss. 413 F.2d 743, 744 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1969).
United States v. Zickler, supra, is much like our own case. Zickler's claim concerning the invalidity of an induction order was founded on the Scott decision and he moved to dismiss the indictment. Judge Luongo there noted that such a motion is not a device for "summary trial of the evidence since its sole function is to test the sufficiency of the indictment [on its face] to charge an offense." Zickler, Slip Opinion at 2. The indictment is valid if it is a "plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). We find that the indictment here is "sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against which he must defend himself; to protect him against double jeopardy; and to enable the court to determine whether the facts alleged are sufficient in law to withstand a motion to dismiss or to support a conviction." United States v. Fargas, 267 F. Supp. 452, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). As both Judges Luongo and Huyett have held, see Zickler and Winer, supra, questions as to the validity of the induction order are matters of defense properly raised at the time of trial.
Defendant has also moved for a bill of particulars under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). We consider his seven requests separately.
(1) The names, ages, addresses, years of service, and military affiliation, of each member of Local Board No. 109, 333 DeKalb Steet, Norristown, ...