We do not disagree that the denial of the right to summation is a denial of due process and right to counsel which should result in the granting of relief by way of habeas corpus. We do dispute relator's contention that a judge's denial of requested points for charge is the same as the denial of the right to summation.
Our research discloses that the cases which discuss a judge's refusal to give certain points for charge consider this subject in a different context from that suggested by our relator. Rather than suggesting that such refusal amounts to a denial of the right to counsel or the right to summation, these cases indicate that such a denial is not reviewable on a petition for habeas corpus unless there has been a fundamental error resulting in a deprivation of due process. United States ex rel. Young v. Rundle, 308 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1969); United States ex rel. Chase v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 928, 88 S. Ct. 865, 19 L. Ed. 2d 991 (1968); see United States ex rel. Cannon v. Maroney, 373 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1967). None of these cases suggest that the denial of requested points for charge involves a right to counsel issue and we do not now accept that contention. For us to agree with relator's position, we would have to agree that the denial by the trial judge of almost every request or objection of defense counsel during the course of a criminal trial would raise the constitutional issue of right to counsel. We would hence have to conclude that trial rulings and errors would almost inevitably involve a constitutional issue and be reviewable in federal court on a petition for habeas corpus: a view that is specifically at odds with the Third Circuit decision in United States ex rel. Cannon v. Maroney, supra. See also, Atwell v. State of Arkansas, 426 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1970); Reese v. Cardwell, 410 F.2d 1125 (6th Cir. 1969).
This is not to say that all trial rulings are immune from review on a petition for habeas corpus. Rather, with respect to points for charge, relator must show that the judge's rulings were fundamental error resulting in a deprivation of due process of law. United States ex rel. Young v. Rundle, supra. Rather than bring to our attention specific instances where error is claimed, our relator has contented himself with the general allegation of denial of his right to counsel. On this record we cannot grant relief since we cannot know what specific rulings are the source of our relator's complaint.
 Inordinate delay in the disposition of a PCHA petition
The inordinate delay he complains of relates to a challenge to a different conviction (1957) from the one which he challenges in his present federal petition. There is no merit to this claim as a basis for habeas corpus relief on his 1960 conviction. We note also that since the filing of this federal habeas petition, he has been granted relief in the state courts with respect to his 1957 conviction. His present claim is therefore moot.
 Denial of the right to be resentenced on his present (1960) conviction in the light of a prior illegal conviction
The district attorney has admitted that the sentencing judge in 1961 considered a pre-sentence report which noted that relator had been committed to Camp Hill as a juvenile in 1957. He also has admitted that the judgment which led to relator's commitment in 1957 has been vacated and that the district attorney will not reprosecute the relator. Rather than admitting that relator is entitled to be resentenced on his 1960 conviction, the district attorney suggests that relator has failed to exhaust his available state remedies.
We cannot accept this position. Relator's second state habeas corpus petition specifically raised the question of the improper consideration of his juvenile record at his sentencing on his 1960 conviction. After that claim was specifically denied and he was granted leave to appeal, nunc pro tunc, relator's main allegation on appeal concerned the improper consideration when he was sentenced after his 1960 conviction of his juvenile incarceration in 1957. The Superior Court affirmed his 1960 conviction and the Supreme Court denied the request for allocatur. Admittedly, when the appellate courts considered these claims, his 1957 conviction was not yet vacated and his state habeas corpus petitions did not specifically request resentencing as the appropriate remedy. But we do not feel that this difference is enough to justify the claim that our relator has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. We hold that our relator has exhausted his state remedies, as required as a matter of comity by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 557 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1969).
"[Due] process requires that a state prisoner be given the opportunity to bring to the attention of the sentencing court the fact that he has previously served time on an erroneous sentence; and, if he has not had this opportunity because the prior sentence was invalidated subsequent to his sentencing on the valid sentence that he is then serving, that he be given a hearing to bring this fact to the attention of the sentencing court." United States ex rel. Smith v. Rundle, 285 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States ex rel. Olden v. Rundle, 279 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Bauers v. Yeager, 261 F. Supp. 420 (D.N.J. 1966); accord, United States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707, 712 (3d Cir. 1967). We feel in this case that our relator is entitled to be resentenced on his 1960 conviction, No. 1364, and to bring to the attention of the sentencing court the fact that his 1957 conviction has been vacated. Accordingly, we will grant the writ limited to relator's request for resentencing.
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