the same matter, Detective Otis Terry went before Magistrate Benjamin Segal to obtain an arrest warrant, which was issued that same day. Detective Terry also obtained an arrest warrant for Ethel Walker, to whom Thomas Moore claimed he was married and who was also implicated in the robbery. With these warrants, Detective Terry, Shaw and four uniformed officers went to 2220 North Tenth Street, Philadelphia, to serve the warrants. When Terry rang the bell, Moore answered the door. When he identified himself as Thomas J. Moore, Shaw then identified Moore as one of the robbers. N.T.T. 42-43. After the arrest, Terry stated that he asked Ethel Walker for Willie Shaw's wallet which she then gave to Detective Terry. N.T.T. 88-90. Moore, in his present petition, contends that the wallet was obtained in an exploratory search of his home at the time of his arrest. The wallet was later introduced into evidence at Moore's trial.
It is not necessary for this Court to determine that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrant since we conclude that there was probable cause to make the arrest here even without a warrant.
Probable cause exists when sufficient facts have been established to warrant a man of reasonable caution with reasonably trustworthy information in believing that an offense had been committed and that the accused had committed that offense. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959); United States ex rel. Saunders v. Ziegler, 319 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa., 1970). An arrest is valid when supported by probable cause even if a warrant under which the arrest is conducted is deemed invalid. Dearinger v. United States, 378 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 885, 88 S. Ct. 156, 19 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1967).
The arrest of Moore was not made until Shaw, the victim, had identified Moore as one of the robbers. Arrests in similar circumstances as here have been held to be supported by probable cause. United States v. Curtis, 138 U.S. App. D.C. 360, 427 F.2d 630 (1970); United States ex rel. Foreman v. Casseles, 311 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States ex rel. Young v. Rundle, 308 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Margeson, 246 F. Supp. 219 (D. Me. 1965).
Further, the wallet was properly seized. Relator was given a hearing on his PCHA petition and the means by which the wallet was obtained by Detective Terry was reviewed. The PCHA court explored relator's contention, but did not make a finding of an exploratory search. Relator presents no new information to this Court which indicates any error by the PCHA court. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963). We note that even had there been a search incident to the arrest of relator Moore and Ethel Walker, the seizure of the wallet would have been proper under the then prevailing standard of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1949).
Relator challenges the propriety of the arrest on the ground that the warrant designated a different dwelling from the one where relator was arrested. We note first that it was an arrest warrant that was issued, not a search warrant. Had the police, under the authority of a search warrant designating a particular residence, searched the wrong residence relator would have a bona fide grievance. Here, however, the arrest warrant merely noted the alleged address of relator Moore; that the actual arrest occurred elsewhere is of no consequence as long as there was probable cause to support the arrest. This is true in this case where we have decided that, since there was probable cause to support the arrest, we need not determine the validity of the arrest warrant.
 Denial of a Fair Trial
Relator claims that the joinder of his wife, Ethel Walker, as a co-defendant deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Since he has never presented this particular claim to the state courts, we are compelled to dismiss without prejudice this claim for failure to exhaust state court remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. V 1970); United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Maroney, 413 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1969).
 Knowing Use by Prosecutor of Perjured Testimony
Relator contends that the trial prosecutor and three of his witnesses, Willie Shaw, Harry Anderson (both victims of the robbery), Detective Terry, committed perjury. This charge was reviewed by the PCHA court and the court there found no facts to support relator's claim. Notes of Testimony PCHA Hearing 26-31, 58. [Hereinafter cited as N.T. PCHA]. Relator here presents no new evidence to us to indicate that the PCHA court erred. Hence we accept the finding of the PCHA court that there is no factual basis for this claim. Townsend v. Sain, supra. We cannot grant relief on this claim.
 Obstruction of Direct Appeal
Relator contends that he was denied due process of law when the Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas prevented his filing of his first attempted direct appeal within the appropriate time period. Since relator was later granted a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc, after the PCHA court found in relator's favor on this point, we find no merit in this allegation. United States ex rel. Madison v. Rundle, 422 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1970).
 Failure to Subpoena Alibi Witness at PCHA Hearing
 PCHA Hearing Judge Showed Prejudice
 Relator's Counsel for the PCHA Hearing Rendered Ineffective Assistance
None of these allegations directly attack the lawfulness of relator's conviction under which relator is "in custody." Hence, we question whether such claims are reviewable upon a request for the writ of habeas corpus. To the extent that these allegations attack the integrity of the state collateral proceeding upon which we are now in part relying, we feel compelled to consider relator's allegations. See Townsend v. Sain, supra.
Relator has complained that an alibi witness was not presented before the PCHA court and that his attorney at the PCHA proceeding did not take steps to produce this alibi witness. It is this charge which forms the basis of relator's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his PCHA hearing. We note that relator previously had made this same claim with respect to his trial counsel.
The Court of Appeals has recently held that the Due Process Standard for the determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial is one of normal competency. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 326 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The court, in an attempt to give a contour to this new standard, referred to recent Supreme Court language: "Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970). The Court of Appeals also noted that what was required is "normal and not exceptional representation * * *". Moore v. United States, supra.
Relator's trial counsel was called to testify at the PCHA hearing and pointed out that relator had told him that the alleged alibi witness was unreliable and wouldn't stand up. N.T. PCHA 40-45.
At his trial, relator was identified by the two victims of the robbery. We do not believe that, under the facts of this case, failure to call an alibi witness was a departure from the normal competency standard developed in the Moore decision. As the Third Circuit has noted in a similar case, "When a habeas corpus petitioner alleges as a ground for relief the failure of counsel to exercise normal competence in presenting specific trial evidence it is reasonable, we think, to put on petitioner the burden of showing that the missing evidence would be helpful." United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970). The Post Conviction Hearing indicated that this alibi witness would not have been helpful at trial. Hence, we see no error in counsel's failure to call an alibi witness at the Post Conviction Hearing.
The relator's contention that the PCHA judge showed prejudice rests on two grounds: (1) that the judge allowed perjured testimony to be given and (2) that the judge put the burden of proof on the relator to prove that Detective Terry knowingly committed perjury.
With respect to (1), we note that relator's allegation is substantially the same as his third claim for relief before us. He claims that Detective Terry knowingly lied with respect to the date on which the complaint was signed by the complaining victim and the date the arrest warrant issued. We have carefully reviewed both the Notes of Testimony of his trial and his PCHA hearing. Relator was given an opportunity by the PCHA judge to present any evidence he had which would indicate knowing perjury by Detective Terry; he was unable to do so. N.T. PCHA 27-31. Upon a review of the record of the PCHA hearing, we find that relator was not prejudiced by the judge with respect to the presentation of this claim. See Townsend v. Sain, supra.
With respect to (2), we note that the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Hearing Act imposes the burden of proof on the relator, subject to certain exceptions. 19 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1180-3 (Supp. 1970). Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A. 2d 349 (1967). We cannot find the conduct of the PCHA judge prejudicial when all he has done is to apply the burden of proof compelled by state law.
 Opinion of Judge Troutman of August 28, 1967 did not face squarely the issues raised by relator
What this claim amounts to, according to relator's habeas corpus petition, is that the Honorable William I. Troutman in ruling on relator's post-trial motions, filed nunc pro tunc, did not agree with relator's position on claims which he has again presented to us in his federal habeas corpus petition. Since we have discussed all of these grounds independently above, we find that this last claim of relator is but a mere restatement of his earlier claims, and find no merit in it.
Accordingly, for all the reasons above-stated, we are compelled to deny the request for a writ of habeas corpus.