This Court finds that HEW is aware of the deficiencies in the Center and the need for improvement. This Court further finds that the Department is taking steps to rectify the deficiencies by informal means. These findings lead the Court to conclude that the federal, state and county authorities are not insensitive to the interests of the community in seeking a well operated community mental health center, nor are they permitting any violations of the federal act. Plaintiffs contend that these authorities did not begin their investigation until after plaintiffs' complaint was filed. That statement does not alter the fact that the administrative procedures have been set in motion.
The task force found basic compliance with minimum statutory requirements. Their findings were discretionary, and this Court finds no abuse of discretion which would give rise to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, or the use of the extraordinary writ of mandamus.
Plaintiffs request that this Court declare that the federal Act must be applied in communities containing minority groups in ways which meet the mental health needs of such groups, and that this requires control by such groups. We stated above that the federal, state and county defendants are aware that the Center must meet the needs of the community. If plaintiffs feel they are denied certain benefits, their remedy is 45 C.F.R. 80.1, et seq.
Furthermore, while community participation is needed to assure that the Center meets the needs of the community in which it operates,
this Court finds nothing in the federal, state or county programs which requires community control of community mental health centers. Any declaration of community control would be legislation on the part of this Court, and such action is not within its power. Nor do we know why we should vest control in this particular organization, The North Philadelphia Community Board, rather than any other community group.
The task force report also alluded to plaintiff association's desire to be given control of the Center. HEW and Temple are aware of this desire, and, as stated in the report of November 16, 1970, inquiries are taking place on this matter.
The circumstances in the case at bar are not conducive to judicial intervention at this time. The administrative procedures should be allowed to run their full course before recourse is had to the courts. It is "generally more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages." McKart v. United States, supra, 395 U.S., at 194, 89 S. Ct., at 1663.
Finally, plaintiffs lack standing to complain of and seek relief for any termination of services of staff personnel by Temple. Plaintiffs have failed to allege that any of them are members of that group whose services have been terminated. Plaintiffs lack the requisite directness of interest to seek the aid of the courts and confer jurisdiction upon them. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968); Assoc. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. et al. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970). The present case is clearly distinguishable from the case cited by plaintiffs in which individuals were allowed standing to challenge discrimination in employment practices in Alabama state mental institutions. Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Board, et al., 297 F. Supp. 291 (D.C.1969). In that case Alabama officials were guilty of discrimination in hiring. In the case at bar, there is no allegation of discrimination in hiring, nor is there an allegation of discrimination in firing. There is only the allegation that the services of some staff personnel were terminated by Temple.
In conclusion, we hold that (1). plaintiffs have adequate administrative remedies available for redress of any denial of their civil rights, (2). the federal, state and county defendants are engaged in an administrative investigation of the Center and the Court would abuse its discretion if it interfered with the administrative procedures, (3). there has been no abuse of discretion for which mandamus will lie, (4). plaintiffs lack standing to complain of any misconduct in firing of Center personnel, (5). this court may not direct community control of the Center, for the Court cannot usurp the legislative prerogative.