The opinion of the court was delivered by: TEITELBAUM
The defendant, Clarence Scott, was convicted of five of six counts of mail fraud in violation of Section 1342 of Title 18, United States Code. He has moved for a new trial, asserting the following reasons therefor:
1. That the Court erred in denying defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal made at the conclusion of the Government's case and renewed at the conclusion of all of the evidence,
2. That the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence,
3. That the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence, and
4. That the Court erred in admitting evidence and testimony regarding defendant's use of credit cards not the subject of the indictment in the case and further erred in instructing the jury with respect to such transactions.
I find that each of the contentions are without merit and the motion will be denied.
Because counsel for the defendant has made no request for the transcription of the record of trial, the Court relies in its discussion upon notes of trial taken by the Court and certain excerpts read to the Court by the Court Reporter.
The indictment charged the defendant with engaging in a fraudulent scheme whereby he obtained cash or merchandise through the use of credit cards for which he had applied under fictitious names and which consequently were issued in those fictitious names and mailed to addresses where defendant would recover them. The six counts of the indictment charged that the defendant, in pursuit of this scheme, made six specific, fraudulent, applications for credit accounts: two applications to the Mellon National Bank and Trust Company in the fictitious names of Roy Foster and Ralph D. Cole; two applications to Atlantic-Richfield Company in the fictitious names of Daniel Dane and Roy Foster; an application to the Standard Oil Company in the fictitious name of Roy Foster; and an application to the Texas Oil Company in the fictitious name of Roy Foster.
It cannot be said that the evidence offered by the Government to establish the scheme and individual acts in pursuit thereof was insubstantial. The Government's evidence established the following. At some time before October 24, 1967, an application for a credit account in the name of Daniel Dane, 9509 Kempton Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, was submitted to the Atlantic-Richfield Company, 1100 Chamber of Commerce Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
On October 24, 1967, a credit card was issued in response to the application and mailed to the given address of the applicant. A large outstanding balance existed on this credit account at the time of trial.
The Kempton Avenue address was a dwelling house owned and inhabited by Mrs. Nellie Washington. In 1967, she leased the apartments in the dwelling, one to Jose Crittenden and another to Leonard Dickerson. The defendant resided with Leonard Dickerson for a four month period in the early Summer of 1967.
While in custody in New York, defendant voluntarily spoke with Mr. Bernard Ward, an investigator for Gulf Oil Company. The defendant offered to make a deal with respect to the information Mr. Ward desired, but Mr. Ward refused. Nevertheless, the defendant proceeded to tell Mr. Ward that he had engaged in a practice of securing cash at various gasoline stations by "tipping" operators of those stations for making false representations on credit invoices to the effect that ...