Appeal from order of Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, of Allegheny County, May T., 1966, No. 15, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gus Kontos.
H. David Rothman, Assistant Public Defender, and George H. Ross, Public Defender, for appellant.
Carol Mary Los and Robert L. Campbell, Assistant District Attorneys, and Robert W. Duggan, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Justice Pomeroy. Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the decision of this case.
On March 14, 1966, one Hazel Deere, a 72 year old spinster, was murdered during the course of a robbery committed at her apartment. Shortly thereafter the appellant, Gus Kontos, was arrested and charged with the crime, to which he confessed. On October 3, 1966, Kontos, represented by private counsel, entered a plea of guilty to murder generally,*fn1 and at a subsequently held degree of guilt hearing before a three-judge court, he was found to be guilty of murder in the first degree. The sentence imposed was life imprisonment. No appeal was taken.
On January 2, 1970, the appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq., alleging that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered because it had been primarily motivated by a constitutionally infirm confession. Following a counseled hearing, at which testimony of Kontos and his trial counsel was presented, the hearing judge entered an order denying relief. This appeal followed.
We deem it important initially to note the law in Pennsylvania with respect to collateral attacks on guilty pleas which are alleged to have been primarily motivated by constitutionally infirm confessions. In order successfully to overturn a plea on such grounds, a defendant must first show that he was so incompetently advised by counsel that he could not, under the circumstances, have knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A.2d 481 (1970); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 440 Pa. 598, 269 A.2d 449 (1970); Commonwealth v. Ward, 442 Pa. 351, 275 A.2d 92 (1971). Our inquiry, therefore, is appropriately directed to the reasonableness of counsel's assessment of the case and his advice to his client in light thereof, including advice as to the implications and consequences of entering a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Ward, supra, at p. 351.
Neither in his PCHA petition nor at the hearing thereon did appellant assert that his trial counsel was incompetent in any manner. Moreover, our independent review of the record satisfies us that counsel acted competently in assessing appellant's case, advising a plea of guilty, and making appellant aware of the consequences of entering such a plea. Accordingly, appellant's assertion that he should now be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea must fail.
When a defendant enters a plea of guilty to murder generally, however, he does not thereby waive his right to object to improper evidence which would bear on his degree of guilt and the punishment to be imposed. Commonwealth v. Marsh, supra, at p. 594; Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A.2d 922 (1967). In this regard, the record reveals that on the evening of Kontos' arrest he made oral statements to the police indicating he had planned the Hazel Deere robbery at least one week in advance and that he, with others, actively participated in the robbery during which the injuries causing Miss Deere's death were inflicted. Following a suppression hearing conducted between September 6 and September 19, 1966,*fn2 it was held that these oral statements would be admissible at Kontos' trial. Our review of the record of that hearing compels the conclusion that the confession would not have been admissible at trial, because Kontos was never adequately advised by the interrogating police officers of his right to the assistance of free counsel, if indigent, as dictated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).*fn3 See Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 279, 256 A.2d 464 (1969); Commonwealth v. Dixon and Kontos, 432 Pa. 423, 426 (1968). It follows that the statements should not have been used at the degree of guilt hearing.
Notwithstanding the error of admitting the statements into evidence, we conclude that on the record before us appellant is foreclosed from raising the issue on later ...