(3d Cir. 1969). Under the doctrine, a member of the judiciary is afforded immunity from liability under the Civil Rights Statutes for all acts which are not clearly outside his jurisdiction. Bauers v. Heisel, supra, p. 590. The instant Complaint fails to allege actions of defendant-members of the judiciary which were clearly outside their jurisdiction. In fact, the allegations of the Complaint suggest to the contrary. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial immunity would bar relief against defendant-members of the judiciary.
Dismissal of the cause of action against the National Labor Relations Board is warranted apart from the failure of the Complaint to allege a sufficient conspiracy or action under color of State law. It is doubtful that the National Labor Relations Board could be regarded as a "person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Statutes. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961) and Olson v. California Adult Authority, 423 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1970). Moreover, the civil remedies provided by the Civil Rights Statutes are not means of obtaining redress from alleged errors of the National Labor Relations Board. See Schatte v. International Alliance, etc., 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) and Drusky v. National Labor Relations Board, et al., Civil Action 68-124 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
Finally, insofar as the Complaint may attempt to assert federal cognizable claims against defendant United States Steel Corporation and defendant-Officers of the United Steel Workers of America, under provisions other than the Civil Rights Statutes and arising out of such facts as are alleged, plaintiff is barred from asserting either the causes of action or the facts requisite to establish them upon principles of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel. The summary judgments rendered against plaintiff and in favor of those defendants, or those in privity with them, in Drusky v. National Labor Relations Board, et al., supra, is conclusive here.
Recognizing that a dismissal of a Civil Rights Complaint by the Court, sua sponte and before service of process upon the defendants generally is viewed with disfavor, I nevertheless find that the instant Complaint is so deficient as to warrant its condemnation as frivolous. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915; Davis v. Brierley, et al., 412 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1969).
An appropriate Order is entered.
NOW, this 16th day of March 1971, IT IS ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis be and the same is hereby denied and the Complaint is dismissed.
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