Appeal from judgment of sentence of Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, Sept. T., 1952, No. 81, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. John Martin.
William J. Joyce, William G. McConnell, and Cusick, Madden, Joyce & McKay, for appellant.
Robert F. Banks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Bell. Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the decision of this case.
In 1952, appellant, John Martin, was convicted of first degree murder by a jury, which fixed the penalty at death. He was represented by two very competent attorneys, B. H. Marks and Hiram M. Drake. Marks and Drake are now dead. Defendant appealed to this Court and we granted a new trial because he was not permitted to poll the jury. Commonwealth v. Martin, 379 Pa. 587, 109 A.2d 325. At his arraignment on
remand, on June 13, 1955, defendant, while still represented by Marks and Drake, pleaded guilty generally to the murder for which he was indicted, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. There was no on-the-record inquiry to show the voluntariness of his plea or his awareness of its consequences, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238. See also, Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196. No post-trial motions were filed and no appeal was taken.
On December 29, 1964, defendant-appellant filed a petition in forma pauperis, without counsel, for a writ of habeas corpus. This was denied without a hearing by the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas and no appeal was taken.
Seventeen years after the murder and fourteen years after his guilty plea, appellant, on July 23, 1969, while represented by the Public Defender, filed a Post Conviction Hearing Act petition alleging that there was introduced into evidence a statement made by him in the absence of counsel at a time when representation was Constitutionally required; that there was a violation of his Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; that his plea of guilty was unlawfully induced; and that there was obstruction by State officials of his right of appeal. An amended petition filed by his counsel on May 28, 1969, alleged that defendant's guilty plea was unlawfully induced; that the plea was not made voluntarily; that the plea was not made after proper advice; and that the plea was not made with any understanding of its possible consequences. After a hearing, the petition was denied by the hearing Judge, but appellant was granted the right to appeal the judgment of sentence. We treat this both as an appeal from the Order of the lower Court denying relief of his Post Conviction Hearing Act petition and an appeal nunc
pro tunc from the 1955 judgment of sentence of murder.
Most of appellant's contentions asserted in the Post Conviction Hearing proceeding below are not ...