precondition to their enforcing a foreign judgment.
Since its beginning in Hilton, the concept of reciprocity has not found favor in the United States. It has often been the subject of criticism by commentators
and most courts have refused to follow Hilton on this issue. The concept has been expressly rejected by the courts of New York,
and has been rejected by statute in California.
The courts and commentators have presented cogent reasons for their position that reciprocity should not be the determinative factor in a court's decision on the issue of recognition. The primary reason which has been advanced is that our legal system has adopted a policy that calls for an end to litigation. Whether or not a foreign court would recognize an American judgment is not relevant to this policy. However, it is in furtherance of that objective if litigation which was begun in a foreign court and which is presently before an American tribunal, is brought to an end. The Court finds that the concept of reciprocity is a provincial one, one which fosters decisions that do violence to the legitimate goals of comity between foreign nations. Therefore, absent a positive showing that Pennsylvania would follow the Hilton decision with respect to reciprocity, this Court will not presume that it would adhere to such an undermined concept. This Court finds that if presented with the issue, the Pennsylvania courts would follow its neighboring state of New York and expressly reject this concept. We find this to be particularly true since Pennsylvania, like New York, is one of the largest centers of both national and international commercial activities.
Defendant also asserts that to enforce the English judgment would violate the public policy of Pennsylvania since that judgment includes in the award of damages an amount for loss of good will and counsel fees. It is a well-established rule of law that a court will not enforce a foreign judgment, be it of a sister state or foreign nation, if to do so would violate the forum's public policy. The courts of a state will not violate a strong state policy in the vindication of a private wrong regardless of whether or not the judgment would otherwise be entitled to enforcement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that it will not enforce a foreign judgment which violates "'a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people [of this Commonwealth] and in their conviction of what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal.'" Christoff Estate, supra, 411 Pa. at p. 424, 192 A. 2d at p. 739, quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A. 2d 407 (1941).
In support of its contention that the enforcement of this judgment would violate public policy, defendant has cited Pennsylvania cases which demonstrate that loss of good will and, under normal circumstances, attorney fees, would not be directly recoverable in a similar action instituted in Pennsylvania. Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A. 2d 472 (1959); Shapiro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 210 A. 2d 890 (1965). However, merely because the forum has a different rule of law, whether legislatively or judicially founded, does not automatically render the foreign law contrary to the public policy of the forum.
It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that merely because Pennsylvania would not allow a direct recovery in a particular instance, nevertheless it would, in a choice of law situation, allow such a recovery. E.g. Dickinson v. Jones, 309 Pa. 256, 163 A. 516 (1932). Furthermore, Mr. Justice Stern, speaking for the Mamlin court, stated: "[familiar] illustrations [of judgments which would not be enforced due to public policy] are those involving unreasonable restraints of marriage or of trade, collusive arrangements for obtaining divorces, suppression of bids for public contracts, interference with freedom of conscience or religion." Mamlin v. Genoe, supra, 340 Pa. at 325, 17 A. 2d at 409. The Court finds that the inclusion of loss of good will and counsel fees in an award of damages is wholly dissimilar to the types of cases enumerated by Mr. Justice Stern. Therefore the Court concludes that while Pennsylvania may not agree that these elements should be included in damages for breach of contract, the variance with Pennsylvania law is not such that the enforcement "tends clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel, is against public policy." Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514, 518, 26 A. 665, 666 (1893).
For all of the above reasons, and since the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
And now, to wit, this 2nd day of October, A.D. 1970, it is ordered that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be and the same is hereby GRANTED.
It is further ordered that, due to the ruling in this case, plaintiff's objections to defendant's interrogatories be and the same are hereby SUSTAINED.
And it is so ordered.