in the act) defines only one who with specific intent to further the unlawful aims thereof is knowingly a member.
The absence of a definition of "foreign subversive organization" when "subversive organization" is fully defined has no importance whatsoever in this case. "Subversive organization," without more, of course includes all subversive organizations, be they domestic or foreign, and so the words "foreign subversive organization" are superfluous and meaningless here. Statutory construction compels us to ignore these words, or to harmonize them with the balance of the act and read all of the words together to effectuate the purposes of the legislature and its intent to enact a statute which is constitutional and valid. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270, 76 S. Ct. 349, 100 L. Ed. 309 (1956); Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715, 83 L. Ed. 1134 (1939); Port Constr. Co. v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 359 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1966); Statutory Construction Act, Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019 (46 P.S. §§ 551, 552).
Plaintiff's major contention is that the loyalty oath, on its face and as applied to her, is unconstitutional under the United States Constitution in that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and through it the First Amendment "in that it infringes upon and invades plaintiff's right of freedom of speech, belief, association and free elections"
by imposing unconstitutional conditions on her right to be a candidate for public office; by "imposing prior restraints" upon her "through language which is vague, speculative, and uncertain, and by imposing sanctions, including the threat of disqualification from all elective office, as well as a finding of disloyalty and prosecution for perjury."
In support of her contention plaintiff cites a number of Supreme Court and lower federal court cases holding statutes providing for loyalty oaths or containing other related provisions violative of First Amendment rights. Among the cases so cited, many of which deserve attention, are: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 88 S. Ct. 184, 19 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S. Ct. 275, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952); Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969); Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876 (D.C. Col. 1967).
We believe that the legislation under attack in the instant case is quite distinguishable from the statutes considered in the cases cited by plaintiff, and that the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act meets the constitutional requirements as delineated by the cases.
In Wieman v. Updegraff, supra, the oath was declared invalid because it barred from state employment persons solely on the basis of certain organizational memberships regardless of their knowledge concerning the organizations to which they had belonged. The Court held that such memberships might be innocent and in such case due process was violated.
The oath required of each employee of the State of Florida was, in Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction, supra, found to be so vague and uncertain that the State could not, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, force an employee either to take such an oath at the risk of subsequent prosecution for perjury or face immediate dismissal. But, unlike our oath, the oath there required the swearing that the affiants had never "knowingly lent their aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party" (368 U.S. at 285, 82 S. Ct. at 280). The Court correctly points out that in the not too distant past Communist Party candidates appeared legally on the ballot in many states, and that elsewhere the Communist Party supported and endorsed candidates of other parties and that in view of this it would be extremely difficult for anyone to honestly subscribe to the oath if he had ever supported any cause with knowledge that the Communist Party also supported it. This, of course, was an invalid oath as being too vague and too broad.
This brings us to one of the landmark cases in this field: Baggett v. Bullitt, supra. Here the Court followed the Cramp case and found the oath unconstitutionally broad, uncertain and vague. The oath in Baggett required teachers and State employees to swear that "he is not a subversive person: that he is not one who commits an act or who advises, teaches, abets or advocates by any means another person to commit or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow or alter, or to assist the overthrow or alteration, of the constitutional form of government by revolution, force, or violence" (377 U.S. at 367, 84 S. Ct. at 1320). The Court points out, at 369, 84 S. Ct. at 1321, that under the act there in question, a person "is subversive not only if he himself commits the specified acts but if he abets or advises another in aiding a third person to commit an act which will assist yet a fourth person in the overthrow or alteration of constitutional government." Additionally, the Court finds fault with the use of the word "revolution," which it says may include any rapid or fundamental change peacefully done. Neither of these vices appear in the Pennsylvania law.
The oath in Keyishian, supra, was struck down because,
"The regulatory maze created by New York is wholly lacking in 'terms susceptible of objective measurement.' Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, supra, at 286, [82 S. Ct., at 280]. It has the quality of 'extraordinary ambiguity' found to be fatal to the oaths considered in Cramp and Baggett v. Bullitt. '[Men] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application * * *.' Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, [377 U.S.], at 367, [ 84 S. Ct., at 1320]. Vagueness of wording is aggravated by prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative machinery, and by manifold cross-references to interrelated enactments and rules." (385 U.S. at 604, 87 S. Ct. at 684)
Here also the Court found "impermissible 'overbreadth'" where the law sought to bar employment both for associations which legitimately may be proscribed and for associations which may not be proscribed consistently with First Amendment rights because the law condemned mere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of a subversive organization.
The Whitehill v. Elkins case, supra, about which we will have more to say later, followed the Keyishian case and found that when an oath requires under threat of perjury the statement that the applicant is not engaged "in one way or another" in an attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence, and that the act of assembly which the Court found was "tied to" the oath, condemned those who would "'alter' the form of government 'by revolution, force, or violence'" and also those who are members of a subversive organization, then the oath is constitutionally bad. As was said in a recent law review article, "'The act [in the Whitehill case] was vague because it was broad; it was broad because it lacked a scienter limit; and the absence of scienter was fatal for the consequent chilling effect upon 'conscientious teachers.'"
In none of the Supreme Court cases cited, nor in any other related case which has been called to our attention or which we have discovered (See: Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S. Ct. 1238, 16 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1966); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 78 S. Ct. 1311, 1324, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1423 (1958); Beilan v. Bd. of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399, 78 S. Ct. 1317, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1414 (1958); Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S. Ct. 909, 95 L. Ed. 1317 (1951)) did the Court condemn all loyalty oaths. Indeed, in many of the cases the Court specifically pointed out that states quite properly could adopt measures to safeguard the public service from disloyal conduct or disloyal servants or employees. Baggett v. Bullitt, supra; Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction, supra; Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, supra. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195, 73 S. Ct. 215, 221, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined, concurring, said:
"The Constitution of the United States does not render the United States or the States impotent to guard their governments against destruction by enemies from within. It does not preclude measures of self-protection against anticipated overt acts of violence. Solid threats to our kind of government -- manifestations of purposes that reject argument and the free ballot as the means for bringing about changes and promoting progress -- may be met by preventive measures before such threats reach fruition. * * *"