Appeal from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Sept. T., 1953, No. 3, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Leonard P. Mahaffey.
Richard D. Walker, for appellant.
Jerome T. Foerster, Assistant District Attorney, and LeRoy S. Zimmerman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Justice Cohen. Mr. Justice Roberts concurs in the result.
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. Leonard Mahaffey, appellant, was arrested in Cleveland, Tennessee on July 18, 1953 on a charge of having committed a robbery in Dauphin County. He waived extradition and was returned on July 20. The next day a charge of murder was entered against him, and a preliminary hearing was held the day after. Appellant
was indicted on September 14, 1953, and on September 21 while represented by counsel he pleaded guilty to the murder charge. Beginning on November 5 a three-judge panel took testimony, and on December 21 the court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment. No post-trial motions were filed, and no direct appeal was taken.
In 1959 appellant filed his first habeas corpus petition which was dismissed in Commonwealth ex rel. Mahaffey v. Banmiller, 74 Dauphin 104 (1959). His second petition was dismissed in Commonwealth ex rel. Mahaffey v. Maroney, 83 Dauphin 220 (1965), and we affirmed at 418 Pa. 631, 213 A.2d 216 (1965). Appellant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania which was dismissed in an unreported opinion by Judge Follmer in which he stated: "Petitioner's constitutional rights were fully protected at all stages of the proceedings, from the time of his arrest in Tennessee to the time of his sentence. The petition is completely without merit, as were the petitions in Dauphin County, and will be denied." (Filed March 3, 1966).
Thereafter, on March 23, 1967, appellant filed his first petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, and this was dismissed in Commonwealth v. Mahaffey, 88 Dauphin 90 (1967). Mahaffey filed in this Court a petition for extension of time to file an appeal which we granted on October 26, 1967, but he did not continue with his appeal. This is appellant's second PCHA petition, and because the Commonwealth felt it could not establish that appellant has knowingly waived his right to a direct appeal, the court below permitted him to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. On August 29, 1969 it dismissed his motion for a new trial, 91 Dauphin 194 (1969), and this appeal has resulted.
Mahaffey makes, in essence, three arguments. The first is that the confession he made was not a voluntary
one and that this confession was the motivation for his guilty plea. In support of this he contends that during interrogation he was not informed of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him, and he states that he was entitled to the Miranda warnings because his conviction was not finalized as of the date Miranda was decided citing Commonwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248 A.2d 32 (1968). In our previous opinion we stated, 418 Pa. at 632: "We have carefully examined the record and agree with the court below that no meritorious reason is assigned or evident to warrant the issuance of the writ." Nothing appears in the record before us now to alter that opinion. In addition, this issue was raised in his first PCHA petition (his third state court petition), and the court below dismissed it. We gave appellant extra time to appeal from that order, but he decided not to take an appeal. Finally, under the guidelines announced in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), a defendant may not gain relief merely by alleging that a coerced confession induced his guilty plea. The United States Supreme Court stated, 397 U.S. at 770-71: "In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the grounds that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends ...