equitable relief altering the long established status quo is to be granted. Under these circumstances, the authorities relied on by plaintiffs do not justify the reinstatement of a temporary restraining order terminated, after hearing, because of lack of proof (a) of an absence of valid consents and (b) of definition of the appropriate class of plaintiffs.
In the stay order entered by Circuit Justice Harlan on August 5, 1965, in Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 15 L. Ed. 2d 51, 86 S. Ct. 10, which is relied on by plaintiffs, the unconstitutionality of a recent 1964 New York statute was involved and Mr. Justice Harlan noted, at page 11 of 86 S. Ct., that "[its] validity under the Federal Constitution was upheld only by a closely divided vote of the New York Court of Appeals." See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y. 2d 47, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 75, 209 N.E. 2d 701 (1965). In the case now before the court, the validity of state procedural statutes dating from the early Nineteenth Century are challenged and maintenance of the status quo will be secured by the continued application of these old statutes, not by restraining the application of a recently enacted statute which was the situation presented in the Seagram case.
Similarly, Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 660, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 412, 71 S. Ct. 806, 95 L. Ed. 1062 (1951), involved a request for injunctive relief against a recently adopted regulation. Also, the other cases relied on by plaintiffs are inapplicable to the facts presented by this record.
At the hearing on the above Motion, plaintiffs asked that the Motion be expanded to request relief from paragraph D of the order of June 16, 1970, insofar as that paragraph restricted the temporary restraining order to prevent executions on judgments entered on the basis of confession of judgment clauses in relevant documents signed only by those debtors who had incomes of less than $ 10,000. Again we believe that the record does not contain sufficient basis for declaring a long existent state practice unconstitutional in the case of debtors having incomes in excess of $ 10,000. per annum (see pages 1098-1099
of opinion of June 1, 1970, being Document 66). Furthermore, there is no showing of irreparable harm to those debtors with incomes in excess of $ 10,000. in the entry of confessed judgments against them. The expense of the motions to open and motions to strike procedure outlined at pages 1094-1095 and 1100 of the June 1 opinion is not necessarily unduly burdensome for such debtors.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for injunction pending appeal will be denied.
And now, June 24, 1970, it is ordered that the motion for injunction pending appeal (Document 71) is denied.