Appeals from order of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, March T., 1966, Nos. 2079, 2080, and 2081, in case of Commonwealth v. Marvin Ware.
James D. Crawford, Assistant District Attorney, with him Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Arthur F. Earley, for appellee.
Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts. Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Jones dissent.
In January of 1967 appellee was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery and conspiracy. Post-trial motions were then filed, appellee asserting that his confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and therefore should not
have been admitted at trial. The court en banc agreed with appellee and awarded him a new trial. The Commonwealth took this appeal and we affirm.
The facts surrounding the securing of appellee's confession are as follows: On January 27, 1966, appellee was awakened early in the morning and taken by police to the Police Administration Building for questioning in connection with a robbery-murder which had occurred approximately one month before. He was questioned extensively until late in the day, when police officers took him home. This procedure was again repeated on the next day. On January 31 appellee's sister gave police a statement indicating that appellee had killed a man on the date in question. The next day appellee was again taken to police headquarters. He was questioned from 11:30 A.M. until 5:30 P.M., when he finally made an oral admission. It was at this time that appellee was first warned of his constitutional rights.*fn1 Following the giving of the required warnings, appellee dictated a statement which he then signed. It was this final written statement which was introduced at trial.
The admissibility of the instant confession is controlled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).*fn2 There the United States Supreme Court held: "To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. . . . He must be warned
was properly admitted. We agree with the court en banc that this argument is without merit.
The Commonwealth relies primarily on Commonwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 239 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 882, 89 S. Ct. 189 (1968). In Moody, which was decided under Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964), the accused "unhesitatingly" replied to a general inquiry: "I shot my wife." He was then told he had a right to remain silent, after which he stated: "I want to get it off my chest. I want to tell the truth, I shot my wife." Relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), we stated that the question was whether the confession had been obtained "'"by the exploitation of that [primary] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the ...