In so finding, the Court relies upon the very particular circumstances giving rise to the new arrangement. To an old and faithful local customer, Glenshaw began in early 1966 to supply to defendants a glass bottle weakened to the extent that increased breakage occurred both before the bottles were ever placed on defendants' bottling line and after they were placed upon the machinery of defendants which was intended to carry them. Defendants suffered a loss as a result of this change in the quality of its sole supplier's product and it is wholly understandable that compensation was provided through an accommodation between Glenshaw and defendants rather than by suit.
The compensation provided by Glenshaw was given in the form of credit and services, the service being to remove with its own trucks its own unusable product from defendants' plant. As Mr. Robert Kay, District Sales Manager for Glenshaw, testified, Glenshaw chose to collect broken glass or "cullet" from its local bottler-customers in 1966 and 1967 as a sales promotion device, and the strong inference which the Court draws from the statement is that Glenshaw, by doing so, was making good to its local customers for increased breakages experienced with its new bottles.
Mr. Crawford, President of Glenshaw, also testified to the effect that the introduction of broken glass into a batch of glass was not deemed necessary by Glenshaw and that the collection of broken glass from others was even less necessary because Glenshaw had available at its own plant sufficient cullet resulting from its production.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the employees collecting broken glass in defendants' plant were engaged in the last stages of a transaction which was in substance local, the return of goods produced for local consumption by Glenshaw, but which were found unsatisfactory by defendants and upon which credit was granted. That bottles broken on defendants' line as well as those cracked when received were returned is in no way inconsistent with the conclusion that defendants were merely returning unsatisfactory goods, both by rejection upon receipt of the goods and by revocation of acceptance of those which contained latent defects discoverable only on the bottling line. Because defendants' purchase of bottles and return of broken ones was from and to a local manufacturer, the instant case is distinguishable from the case of Shoemake v. Gainesville Nehi Bottling Co., Inc., (N.D. Ga. 1967), 55 Lab. Cas. (CCH) Para. 31,898.
In these circumstances, the Court concludes that defendants were not indirect participants in the later production by Glenshaw of glass bottles, some of which most likely would have been sold by Glenshaw in interstate commerce. The Court also concludes that defendants' employees, in gathering the pieces of the cracked and broken bottles produced by Glenshaw, were no more employed in a "closely related process or occupation directly essential to" production in commerce than engaged in the production of goods for such purpose.
The provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act must be applied on an ad hoc basis to the given facts of each case. In the instant case, the collection of glass by defendants for return and credit was, in substance and not merely form, an integral part of Glenshaw's production of goods for local consumption.
With respect to the Government's contention that defendants violated the record keeping provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 211(c), the record is deficient of evidence to sustain such a contention.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies the request for injunctive relief, both as to the withholding of wages, which the Court finds are not due, and as to any potential future violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which the Court presently has no reason to anticipate.
Defendants acknowledged at trial that they are currently subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act by virtue of falling within the coverage of recently effective Amendments. It seems almost unnecessary to say that, should they now fail to comply with each and every obligation now imposed upon them by the Act, the Government most certainly may seek recourse against them in this Court.
Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Opinion shall constitute the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
An appropriate Order is entered.
NOW, this 4th day of February, 1970, judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff.