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INDUSTRIAL VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. PLY-MAR FURNITURE AND CARPET COMPANY (11/13/69)

decided: November 13, 1969.

INDUSTRIAL VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
v.
PLY-MAR FURNITURE AND CARPET COMPANY, INC. (ET AL., APPELLANT)



Appeal from order of Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, No. 67-4149, in case of Industrial Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Ply-Mar Furniture and Carpet Company, Inc. et al.

COUNSEL

Jack A. Rounick, with him Moss, Rounick and Hurowitz, for appellant.

Lewis H. Gold, with him Peter J. Cianci, and Adelman and Lavine, for appellee.

Wright, P. J., Watkins, Montgomery, Jacobs, Hoffman, Spaulding, and Cercone, JJ. Opinion by Hoffman, J. Wright, P. J., would affirm on the opinion of Lowe, J.

Author: Hoffman

[ 215 Pa. Super. Page 431]

This is an appeal from the order of the lower court discharging a rule to open judgment.

Appellee, Industrial Valley Bank and Trust Company ["Bank"], entered a judgment upon a note containing a confession clause, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County against Ply-Mar Furniture and Carpet Company, Inc., A. Joseph Galanti, and Mary V. Galanti, his wife. The judgment note purportedly was signed by Mary V. Galanti as president of the Company and individually.

Mary V. Galanti filed a petition to open judgment, alleging that she had never executed the signatures on the note purporting to be hers. A rule was granted upon the Bank to show cause why the judgment should not be opened.

Depositions were taken of Mary V. Galanti and her husband, both of whom testified that the signatures were not hers. No evidence was presented by the Bank to establish the genuineness of the signatures.

[ 215 Pa. Super. Page 432]

The court below denied the petition to open judgment and discharged the rule. This appeal followed.

Where a judgment entered on a note is attacked on the ground of forgery, the note itself is of no weight in establishing its genuineness. Kaier v. O'Brien, 202 Pa. 153, 51 A. 760 (1902); Levy v. Gilligan, 244 Pa. 272, 90 A. 647 (1914); Austen v. Marzolf, 294 Pa. 226, 143 A. 908 (1928); Mutual B. & L. Ass'n. v. Walukiewicz, 322 Pa. 240, 185 A. 648 (1936); Yank v. Eisenberg, 408 Pa. 36, 182 A.2d 505 (1962). Thus, when a note is attacked, the party offering the note must come forward with evidence of its genuineness. Boyd v. Kirch, 234 Pa. 432, 83 A. 366 (1912); Levy v. Gilligan, supra; Mutual B. & L. Ass'n. v. Walukiewicz, supra; Yank v. Eisenberg, supra. Where affirmative evidence of forgery remains uncontradicted, however, the judgment must be opened. Compare Kaier v. O'Brien, supra; Yank v. Eisenberg, supra; with Carlson v. Sherwood, 416 Pa. 286, 206 A.2d 19 (1965).

In Yank, judgment was entered against a wife on a note purportedly signed by her. Both she and her husband testified that her signature was a forgery. The husband's testimony was somewhat weakened by a prior inconsistent statement but no evidence of genuineness was ...


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