to its admission and the facts before the trial court were not such as would alert it to make an independent determination of its voluntariness.
Nor does the fact that petitioner was unrepresented by counsel at the time of his confession render unconstitutional its admission at his trial in 1962. The decisions rendered in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), do not apply retroactively to the petitioner's trial. Also, since it is concluded that the confession was properly admitted into evidence, the contention that petitioner was deprived of his privilege against self-incrimination is also without merit.
It is next contended that petitioner's two trial counsel were ineffective. The failure of counsel to object to the admission of petitioner's confession at trial hardly reflects upon their competence. When, prior to petitioner's apprehension, police officers entered the bar to find petitioner and his victim, petitioner volunteered without interrogation the statements, "I shot him. I hope I killed him." Under the circumstances, it is clear that counsel, as a matter of trial strategy, acquiesed in the admission of the confession to show a possible justification for the act committed.
Twenty-nine witnesses testified on behalf of the Commonwealth at trial. Beyond the cross-examination conducted and the case presented by the defense counsel, it is difficult to see what more could have been done for petitioner. The contention that counsel for petitioner were ineffective is contradicted by the facts of record.
Petitioner's contention that state officials obstructed his right to appeal is groundless. Petitioner had an appeal and was represented by counsel in that appeal.
Petitioner finally raises the question as to whether the waiver provisions of Section 4 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 19 Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann. § 1180-4, may be applied by the Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to bar petitioner from raising in his second post-conviction proceeding constitutional questions which either were litigated by petitioner or available but unraised by petitioner in his first post-conviction proceeding which was adjudicated prior to the enactment of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. It is not necessary to consider this question for the reason that this Court has made an independent determination of the merits of each of the constitutional claims asserted in petitioner's second post-conviction proceeding in the state courts, all of which he has again raised in this Court.
After a full review of the state court records in this proceeding, the Court concludes that each of the grounds asserted in the instant Petition are without merit, being unsupported either in law or fact.
An appropriate order is entered.
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