Appeal from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 5 of Philadelphia County, June T., 1964, No. 1582, in case of Mrs. Arlene M. Wilson v. United News Transportation Co. et al.
Lowell A. Reed, Jr., with him Rawle & Henderson, for appellants.
Charles F. Quinn, with him Sheer & Mazzocone, for appellee.
Wright, P. J., Watkins, Montgomery, Jacobs, Hoffman, Spaulding, and Cercone, JJ. Opinion by Watkins, J.
[ 215 Pa. Super. Page 319]
In this workmen's compensation case the defendant-employer, United News Transportation Company, and its insurance carrier, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, appealed from an order of the Court of Common Pleas No. 5 of Philadelphia County that had remanded the record to the Workmen's Compensation Board on the ground of capricious disregard of competent evidence in denying benefits to the claimant-appellee, Arlene M. Wilson.
The claimant's decedent, her late husband, Andrew Wilson, was employed by the appellant company as a truck driver when on February 28, 1959 he was involved in an automobile accident, while making a delivery, that resulted in a fractured hip. He was paid compensation under an open agreement until the date of his death on April 15, 1959. The appellee signed a final receipt dated October 13, 1960 which reads: "Injured died from sources other than accident".
The appellee filed a Fatal Claim Petition on June 2, 1961 more than two (2) years after the death of her husband in behalf of herself and five (5) minor children. She alleged that the death was due to an embolism caused by the accident which had fractured his hip. The appellants denied any causal relationship between death and the accident and raised the bar of the sixteen (16) month Statute of Limitations of Section
[ 215 Pa. Super. Page 320315]
of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 602.
The referee found for the claimant; the Board reversed and held that there was no causal connection and that the widow's petition was barred by the statute. On appeal, the court below remanded to the Board on the theory that the Board had capriciously disregarded competent evidence that the statute had been tolled by certain monetary payments to the appellant; and as to causation.
We are unable to comprehend how the court below could come to the conclusion that the Board capriciously disregarded competent evidence in failing to find that the running of the statute had been extended. The pertinent findings of the Board are as follows:
"Second: The Board finds as fact that there was no conduct on the part of the defendant or its representatives to induce the ...