The opinion of the court was delivered by: DAVIS
JOHN MORGAN DAVIS, District Judge.
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After having been indicted for murder in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, Philadelphia, the relator initially entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. At the time of trial on April 12, 1965, however, he changed his plea to guilty, with certification by the District Attorney that the crime did not rise higher than murder in the second degree. In accordance with the practice of the Commonwealth, the trial judge then conducted a degree-of-guilt hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the relator was adjudged guilty of murder in the second degree. A sentence of ten to twenty years imprisonment was imposed. No appeal was taken. On March 15, 1968, a Post Conviction petition was dismissed, after an evidentiary hearing. An appeal was taken to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed the Order of the Post Conviction Judge, on January 28, 1969. Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294. State remedies have been exhausted.
The Post Conviction hearing which was conducted in March of 1968 permitted the relator and his counsel to comprehensively set forth their evidence in support of the five allegations of error which are presently being asserted. Accordingly, there is no requirement for an additional evidentiary hearing. See e.g. United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Darrah v. Brierley, 290 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.Pa.1968).
The relator first contends that the apprehending police elicited a statement from him without first having given the requisite "warnings".
Initially, we observe that the relator's trial commenced on April 12, 1965. The only "warnings" to which the relator would be entitled are in accordance with Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).
Briefly, this decision held that where a police investigation has progressed from the general investigatory stage to the accusatorial stage, the accused must be afforded the opportunity to consult with his counsel, and must be warned of his right to remain silent. Unless this is accomplished no statement elicited by the police may be introduced against the accused at trial.
An examination of the transcripts does not indicate that the rule of Escobedo, was violated. First, at no time did the defendant contend that he requested, but was denied the assistance of counsel. Second, the statement which the defendant gave to the police was predicated with the warning that:
* * * anything you say or sign concerning this stabbing can and will be used against you at the time of your trial in court. Understanding this, are you still willing to give a statement?
Q. Will you go on in your own words and tell us what happened?
The relator then proceeded to comprehensively describe the motivation and details surrounding the homicide. See Trial N.T. pp. 10-12.
Thus, it is apparent that the relator received the procedural due process to which he was ...