the Secretary under § 608c(5)(A) of the Act, or in the alternative, that the Act delegates excessive discretion to the Secretary.
We have decided to deny the producers leave to intervene because we think that Congress wished to have the 608a(6) enforcement action to be unencumbered by contests of the legality of orders. Congress's desire to prevent the intrusion of collateral issues which might delay the enforcement of orders of the Secretary is apparent from the circumscribed jurisdiction given the district court under § 608a(6), and the explicit inclusion of a separate administrative procedure for contesting the legality of orders of the Secretary. Under § 608a(6), this Court is given "jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person from violating any order [issued by the Secretary] * * *." If a handler is aggrieved by an order of the Secretary, he may pursue an administrative remedy pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A). Under that section, a party desiring to contest the legality of such an order is given the right to petition and to a hearing before the Secretary.
After the ruling of the Secretary is entered the District Courts are vested with jurisdiction to review the Secretary's ruling. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(B).
It is explicitly provided, however, that the pendency of administrative or judicial review of the legality of the Secretary's Order "* * * shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief pursuant to section 608a(6) of this title." (i.e. the enforcement procedure in the instant case).
In United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 67 S. Ct. 207, 91 L. Ed. 290 (1946), the Supreme Court held that the handler could not contest the legality of the Secretary's Order, in the 608a(6) enforcement proceeding, but must first exhaust his administrative remedy provided for in 608c(15)(A) before the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 608c(15)(B) to hear challenges to the legality of a marketing order or administrative action taken thereunder. The rationale of its decision, as elaborated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 329 U.S. 292-293, 67 S. Ct. at 209 was essentially that Congress did not want enforcement of the Secretary's orders to be obstructed by allowing enforcement proceedings to be enlarged into contests of the legality of orders, and therefore provided a separate procedure for contesting the legality of orders:
"The procedure devised by Congress explicitly gave to an aggrieved handler an appropriate opportunity for the correction of errors or abuses by the agency charged with the intricate business of milk control. In addition, if the Secretary fails to make amends called for by law the handler may challenge the legality of the Secretary's ruling in court. Handlers are thus assured opportunity to establish claims of grievances while steps for the protection of the industry as a whole may go forward. Sections 8a(6) and 8c(15) thus form a complementary procedural scheme. Contrariwise, it would make for disharmony to extrapolate from these provisions of the statute the right to consider independently, in a proceeding by the Government for the enforcement of the Secretary's order, questions for which Congress explicitly furnished the handler an expert forum for contest with ultimate review by a district court.
"The situation before us indicates how disruptive it would be to allow issues that may properly come before a district court in a proceeding under § 8c(15) to be open for independent adjudication in a suit for enforcement under § 8a(6). * * * In large measure, the success of this scheme revolves around a 'producers' fund which is solvent and to which all contribute in accordance with a formula equitably determined and of uniform applicability. Failure by handlers to meet their obligations promptly would threaten the whole scheme. Even temporary defaults by some handlers may work unfairness to others, encourage wider non-compliance, and engender those subtle forces of doubt and distrust which so readily dislocate delicate economic arrangements. To make the vitality of the whole arrangement depend on the contingencies and inevitable delays of litigation, no matter how alertly pursued, is not a result to be attributed to Congress unless support for it is much more manifest than we here find. That Congress avoided such hazards for its policy is persuasively indicated by the procedure it devised for the careful administrative and judicial consideration of a handler's grievance."