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CITY OF PHILADELPHIA v. MORTON SALT CO.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA


September 13, 1968

City of Philadelphia
v.
Morton Salt Co., et al. ; City of Baltimore v. Morton Salt Co., et al. ; State of New York v. Morton Salt Co., et al. ; Town of Amherst and Town of Tonowanda v. Morton Salt Co., et al. ; Board of County Road Commissioners of the County of Wayne v. Morton Salt Co., et al.

Lord, J.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORD

Opinion and Order

LORD, J.:

 Before us is defendant Cayuga's motion to have certain antitrust actions against it dismissed for improper venue.

 One action is a class action instituted on July 1, 1963 by the City of Philadelphia. Cayuga argues that venue with respect to the intervenors in that action is improper and urges us to take appropriate action. The identical issue, involving the identical parties, has already been decided adversely to Cayuga by our late brother Judge Allan K. Grim. City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1965). We are here asked to reconsider that ruling. However, we are in complete agreement with that decision, and the defendant's motion for reconsideration will be denied. See also Hormel v. United States, 11 F.R.D. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

 Defendant has also asked us to dismiss for improper venue the action of the State of New York instituted on August 10, 1966, and the actions by the Towns of Tonowanda and Amherst which were started on October 24, 1966.

 We have previously held that the general venue provisions of the Judicial Code, and in particular 28 U.S.C.A. ยงยง 1391(c) and 1392(a) are complementary to the special venue provision of the Clayton Act and therefore can be looked to in determining venue in antitrust actions. State of New York v. Morton Salt Co., 266 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1967).

 However, "whether we address ourselves to the Clayton Act criterion of where defendant 'transacts business' or the general venue statute test of 'is doing business,' the result is the same. Both require 'more than a few isolated and peripheral contacts with the judicial district.'" Id. at 575.

 The question then for us is whether Cayuga has a sufficient quantum of contacts with the Eastern District to satisfy the venue requirements.

 Cayuga is a foreign corporation which has never registered to do business in Pennsylvania, has owned no real estate or other assets here, and has no office space or employes here. All orders for its products are received by telephone in New York, processed there, and then shipped into Pennsylvania. In the years shown below Cayuga made direct sales and deliveries in the respective districts of Pennsylvania in the following amounts: District 1964 (10 mos.) 1965 1966 (10 mos.) Eastern $23,002.00 $24,173.00 $24,828.50 4,374 tons 4,377 tons 4,589 tons Middle $26,204.37 $34,867.73 $33,521.42 and Western 1,845 tons 4,352 tons 2,726 tons

19680913

© 1992-2004 VersusLaw Inc.



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