MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOSEPH S. LORD, III, District Judge.
Relator has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking the constitutionality of his present confinement at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania. We are now satisfied that he has exhausted state remedies
and will consider the substantive question presented.
During the trial which resulted in relator's present confinement, the Commonwealth called a fingerprint expert who was shown exhibits of fingerprints alleged to be those of the relator. The Commonwealth then moved to have the relator's fingerprints taken in open court for purposes of comparing them with the ones already introduced. Over objection by defense counsel the court ordered the accused to submit to fingerprinting, and this was done at side bar in the jury's presence. Relator argues that this incident violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. We disagree and the petition for habeas corpus therefore will be denied.
There can be no doubt that the privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature * * *." Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). The prohibition is not "an exclusion of [defendant's] body as evidence when it may be material." Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253, 31 S. Ct. 2, 6, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910). To hold otherwise "would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof." Id. See United States v. Chibbaro, 361 F.2d 365 (C.A. 3, 1966), at page 375.
The presence of the jury does not enlarge the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination in this context. In Chibbaro, supra, the defendants were identified by witnesses who had, without defendants' knowledge, seen them and heard their voices. The Court held that the speaking and viewing were involuntary and continued (361 F.2d at page 375):
"* * * The position of the appellants therefore is analogous to what it would be if while in court they had been ordered to speak so that the bank witnesses might have the opportunity to identify their voices. * * *"