be tried in the same proceeding, we have power to adjudicate the entire controversy. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra.
We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that the rule of complete diversity as enunciated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806) must be rigidly maintained. We need not belabor this point except to point out that the principle is not followed whenever the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is operative or the case involves statutory interpleader. See 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 23, 26; Wright, Federal Courts, §§ 24, 74, 75 and cases cited therein; Diversity of Citizenship; The Interpleader Act, 63 Harvard Law Review, 886 (1950); 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Indeed, the defendants' argument was implicitly rejected in Borror, supra, where the court applied pendent jurisdiction to an action under the Pennsylvania Survival Act and the Wrongful Death Act. The survival claim was lawfully before the court under our diversity jurisdiction, and the question was whether the wrongful death claim with the parents and defendants as citizens of Pennsylvania could still be maintained in the court despite a lack of diversity. The appellate court answered in the affirmative.
We hold, therefore, that where a minor is injured and suit is brought by a guardian for his damages and diversity of citizenship exists between the guardian and the defendants, a claim by the child's parents for damages resulting to them from the tort committed against their child may properly be brought with the minor's claim under our pendent jurisdiction even though diversity of citizenship may be lacking vis-a-vis the parents and the defendants.
We believe that our holding implements the purpose of pendent jurisdiction to foster judicial economy, and convenience and fairness to the litigants while at the same time it remains within the limits of our power as prescribed in Article III of the Constitution of the United States.
The defendants, however, have raised another contention. They claim that the amendment to the complaint is barred by the applicable Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations since it comes more than two years after the injuries occurred. See Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 34.
The accident out of which both claims for relief arise occurred on June 24, 1964. The complaint of the guardian on behalf of the minor was timely filed on April 22, 1965. A separate action for the parent's claim was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on June 15, 1966, a few days before the Statute of Limitations ran.
There is no question that if the minor's claim had been instituted in the state court within the necessary two year period and there had been an attempt to amend the complaint to include the parent's cause of action after the two year period had run, it would have been disallowed. Pennsylvania law provides that a second cause of action may not be tacked onto one already instituted if the time provided by the Statute of Limitations has expired.
Talley v. Piersen, 33 F.R.D. 2 (E.D.Pa.1963); Piacquadio v. Beaver Valley Service Co., 355 Pa. 183, 49 A.2d 406 (1946); Casseday v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 343 Pa. 342, 22 A.2d 663 (1942); Lumen v. Paley, 342 Pa. 317, 20 A.2d 752 (1941); Bowers v. Gladstein, 317 Pa. 520, 178 A. 44 (1935); Bahas v. Wilczek, 324 Pa. 212, 188 A. 139 (1936); Wright v. Eureka Tempered Copper Co., 206 Pa. 274, 55 A. 978 (1963); Goodrich-Amram, Standard Pennsylvania Practice §§ 2228(b) 1, 2232(a); Cf. Davis et al. v. Caruso, 60 Schuylkill Legal Record 65 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. 1964). Furthermore, Rule 2232(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides:
"The cause of action of a person required to join in an action as a party plaintiff by Rule 2228 shall be barred by failing to join therein if the defendant has given such person such notice of the pendency of the action as the court by general rule or special order shall direct."