The opinion of the court was delivered by: FOLLMER
A Rule was granted, a Response and Traverse have been filed. There was also filed an affidavit of Joseph N. Shore, a Parole Executive of the United States Board of Parole, Washington, D.C., after which a second Traverse was filed. A hearing on the petition was held on May 20, 1966.
Petitioner was sentenced July 30, 1952 by a United States Military Court to serve fifty years imprisonment on his conviction of murder. The sentence was progressively reduced by clemency to twenty years. He was released on parole January 25, 1962.
On June 2, 1965 petitioner was arrested under a parole violator's warrant. The application for the warrant gave, inter alia, as reasons for its issuance, petitioner had been reported by his wife as having threatened to kill her, as beating her and causing her to flee their home with her nine month and sixteen year old children for safety sake; she had been to the police for protection and had provided the United States Probation Office with a signed sworn statement; petitioner had admitted to the Probation Officer beating his wife, threatening her and drinking to excess, and petitioner had been referred for assistance to local agencies but he had failed to follow through.
Petitioner set forth nine allegations in support of his petition. All of these, with the exception of paragraphs 2, 5 and 7, are mere complaints that he was not afforded rights of formal legal proceedings, including bail, trial, etc.
Petitioner is currently serving the original sentence imposed upon him by the Military Court on July 30, 1952. When released on parole on January 25, 1962 he remained under the custody and supervision of the Attorney General. Doherty v. United States, 280 F.2d 35 (9th Cir., 1960).
Whether a parole should be revoked for a violation of the conditions under which it was granted rests in the sound discretion of the United States Board of Parole. Brown v. Taylor, 287 F.2d 334 (10 Cir., 1961); 18 U.S.C. § 4207.
Furthermore, where there is evidence before the Board showing a violation of the conditions of the parole, the courts should not interefe with the exercise of administrative discretion by the Board unless there is a clear showing that the Board acted capriciously or abused its discretion. Clark v. Stevens, 291 F.2d 388 (6 Cir., 1961).
If any reasonable basis existed upon which the Board could conclude that a violation of the conditions of the parole had occurred, the court should not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Wright v. Settle, 293 F.2d 317 (8th Cir., 1961).
In Martin v. United States Board of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542, 543 (D.D.C.1961), Judge Holtzoff said:
"It must be borne in mind in this connection that there is no constitutional right to a hearing before the Parole Board on the question of revocation of parole. The only reason such a right ...