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May 16, 1966

E. P. Tatum SMITH, Jr.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: LUONGO

 This is a suit by Crompton-Richmond Co., Inc. - Factors (Factors) seeking to recover $25,000 from defendant on a written guarantee which provides:

For valuable consideration I guarantee to Crompton-Richmond Co., Inc. Factors performance of the factoring agreement between Crompton-Richmond Co., Inc. Factors and C. M. Jones & Company, Inc., Calhoun, Georgia, dated December 7, 1961 and payment of all sums due or to become due by C. M. Jones & Company, Inc. arising out of any transactions whether or not connected with said factoring agreement; waive demand on C. M. Jones & Company, Inc. and notice to or demand upon me and agree that no modification of the agreement or waiver, extension, indulgence or surrender or release of security by Crompton-Richmond Co., Inc. Factors at any time shall release me from any obligations then accrued or thereafter to accrue on this guaranty or any part thereof. Payment of any such sums will be made by me immediately upon demand by Crompton-Richmond Co., Inc. Factors. My obligation under this guaranty is EPTS limited to a maximum amount of $25,000.
Tait Smith"

 The background of the controversy appears from these undisputed facts in the record: *fn1"

 In December 1961, a factoring agreement was entered into between Factors and C. M. Jones & Company, Inc. (Jones Co.), personally guaranteed by management of Jones Co. In August 1962, defendant and three associates acquired the stock and control of Jones Co. As part of the transfer of ownership and control, defendant and his three associates executed guarantees in the total amount of $100,000 to replace the personal guarantees of former management, defendant's share of the total guarantee being limited to $25,000. At the time of the transfer, Jones Co. was indebted to Factors in a substantial amount. Thereafter, Factors made further loans to Jones Co. for a period of about five months, at the end of which time the amount owing to Factors was substantially higher than at the time of the transfer. In early 1963, an attempt was made by Jones Co. to effect an arrangement with creditors under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The arrangement was not consummated, Jones Co. was adjudicated bankrupt and was liquidated. After liquidation, there remained due and owing to Factors an amount far exceeding the limit of defendant's guarantee. Following demand for and refusal of payment, this suit was instituted.

 Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 Fed.R.Civ.P., contending that there are no issues for trial since defendant's record admissions clearly establish his liability for the maximum amount under the written guarantee agreement. Defendant opposes the motion on the ground that the writing set out above was not the entire agreement between the parties. Defendant claims that the written guarantee was subject to a contemporaneous oral agreement imposing two conditions upon the written guarantee: (a) it was not to become effective for a period of one year, and then only if (b) Factors had furnished all necessary financial backing to Jones Co. during that one year period. According to defendant, neither condition was complied with, consequently there was a "failure of consideration" and Factors' rights under the guarantee "never ripened."

 Factors' motion for judgment is based on the parol evidence rule. Its position is that, assuming arguendo that the contemporaneous oral agreement was in fact made, the parol evidence rule precludes proof of it. Without proof of the alleged contemporaneous oral agreement, there is no genuine issue remaining for trial and Factors is entitled to judgment in its favor. Plaintiff's position is well taken and summary judgment will be entered in its favor.

 In Pennsylvania, where, by clear, precise and convincing evidence, the party seeking to enforce the agreement has admitted that the writing was not the entire agreement between the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to explain and supplement, but not to contradict express provisions of, the writing. Dunn v. Orloff, 420 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 314 (1966); Boyd's Estate, 394 Pa. 225, 146 A.2d 816 (1958); Allinger v. Melvin, 315 Pa. 298, 172 A. 712 (1934); Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Viking Theatre Corp., 400 Pa. 27, 161 A.2d 610 (1960). The law of New York is not materially different. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. May, 311 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 930, 83 S. Ct. 874, 9 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1963), Circuit Judge Hastie, discussing New York law, pointed out that

"The New York decisions applying the parol evidence rule distinguish contemporaneous oral agreements contradictory to a written contract from those which supplement the writing. While the latter may be enforceable, it is clear that the former are not. With Fadex Foreign Trading Corp. v. Crown Steel Corp., 1947, 272 App.Div. 273, 70 N.Y.S.2d 892, aff'd 1948, 297 N.Y. 903, 79 N.E.2d 739, and American Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 1955, 285 App.Div. 1043, 140 N.Y.S.2d 184, aff'd, 1957, 2 N.Y.2d 954, 162 N.Y.S.2d 358, 142 N.E.2d 423, compare Hicks v. Bush, 1962, 10 N.Y.2d 488, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34, 180 N.E.2d 425. See also Restatement, Contracts ยง 240, comment b."

 I have examined the writing against the background of the circumstances existing when defendant signed the written guarantee. The writing is complete as to the subject it purports to cover. Comparing the writing with the alleged oral agreement, it is obvious that both deal with the same subject, defendant's guarantee of Jones Co.'s obligations to Factors. It is equally obvious that if the alleged oral agreement had been made, parties situated as were defendant and Factors *fn3" would have included the terms of the alleged oral agreement in the writing, whether the alleged oral agreements were intended as conditions precedent to, *fn4" or as the consideration for, *fn5" defendant's guarantee. There is no allegation of fraud, accident or mistake to explain or excuse the omission, consequently the subject of the alleged oral agreement must be considered as having been covered by the writing. I conclude, therefore, that the writing is the complete contract between the parties, the parol evidence rule is applicable and the terms of ...

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