activities of a wholly-owned sales subsidiary in the chain of distribution are to be imputed to the parent corporation for the purpose of determining whether the parent-manufacturer is subject to the jurisdiction of the state court.
No doubt the Pennsylvania Legislature could, as was done by the Florida Legislature,
amend the Business Corporation Act so as to include in the term "doing business" the marketing activities of wholly-owned subsidiary corporations, such as the John Deere sales subsidiary corporations. See: Deere & Co. v. Watts, 148 So.2d 529 (Fla.App.1963). That, however, is not the circumstance here. Pennsylvania has not enacted into law the equivalent of the Florida statute.
We believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, faced with the identical question involved here, would again hold determinative Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra, as it did in Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc., 419 Pa. 65, 213 A.2d 349 (1965). The continuing vitality of Cannon seems to be accepted by other courts. Howell v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 21 F.R.D. 222, f.n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1957), aff'd 258 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1958); Electrosonics International, Inc. v. Wurlitzer Company, 234 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.Pa.1964); United Steelworkers of America v. Copperweld Steel Co., 230 F. Supp. 383 (W.D.Pa.1964); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Epsco, Incorporated, 224 F. Supp. 260 (E.D.Pa.1963); Steiner v. Dauphin Corporation, 208 F. Supp. 104 (E.D.Pa.1962); Hendricks v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 203 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.Pa.1962); Farr's, Inc. v. National Shoes, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 803 (E.D.Pa.1960); Fitzgerald v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 183 F. Supp. 342 (E.D.Pa.1960). See also, 18 A.L.R.2d pp. 193 et seq. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its Botwinick opinion cited favorably three of the foregoing authorities.
Our view that the activities of Syracuse Deere cannot be imputed to Deere and Company for the purpose of determining whether the parent corporation has done or is doing business in Pennsylvania finds support in decisions from other jurisdictions. See: Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Automobile Body Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1965); Blount v. Peerless Chemicals (P.R.) Inc., 316 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963); Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Company, 288 F.2d 738, 741 f.n. 11 (5th Cir. 1961); Manville Boiler Co. v. Columbia Boiler Co. of Pottstown, 269 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1959); Harris v. Deere and Company, 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'g 128 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.C.1955); Gravely Motor Plow & Cultivator Co. v. H. V. Carter Co., 193 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1951); Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 417, 422 (S.D.N.Y.1956), aff'd 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).
We cannot agree with plaintiff that this court validly acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant by the personal service effected upon Wayne A. Hindman at Hindman Supply, Inc., on May 18, 1965. The uncontroverted facts indicate that neither Wayne A. Hindman nor Hindman Supply was at any relevant time an officer, managing agent or general agent of the defendant or an agent of defendant authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process within the meaning of Rule 4(d)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P. The implicit condition precedent to the application of that Rule - that Deere and Company be subject to service of process in this forum - has not been satisfied. So, too, the facts indicate that Hindman Supply, Inc. was not an office or usual place of business of Deere and Company within the meaning of Rule 2180, Penna.R.Civ.P.; that Wayne A. Hindman was not at any pertinent time an executive officer of Deere and Company or an agent or person for the time being in charge of any office or usual place of business of Deere and Company or an agent of Deere and Company authorized by appointment or by statute to receive service of process on its behalf within the meaning of Rule 2180, Penna.R.Civ.P.; and that, in any event, Deere and Company is not subject to service of process in Pennsylvania.
An appropriate order will be entered.