the navigation aids which mark the channels. As indicated this was done by the Coast Guard at Pittsburgh. No doubt this was sufficient for commercial operators, but when the dams were constructed in the late twenties, the Corps of Engineers assumed the responsibility for the operation of the locks and the maintenance of the dams. This placed a different and greater responsibility upon the Corps of Engineers than the Coast Guard had. It appears to this Court that the Corps of Engineers has accepted its responsibility with regard to warnings to be given to inexperienced boaters on the Allegheny River.
The Corps of Engineers has been aware of the special problems presented by the increase in pleasure boating on the Allegheny River. The evidence shows that the Corps has realized that some means other than conventional navigational aids were necessary in an attempt to prevent accidents to the inexperienced. The evidence indicates that the Corps has undertaken a continuing program of research and experimentation with signs and markers in an effort to make explicit to the inexperienced user the proximity and danger of dams.
It cannot be said, on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, that the warning signs above dam 7 were negligently designed, constructed or maintained. This Court finds that the reverse is true. That is, that they were designed, constructed and maintained in a proper manner which would give warning to anyone who casually looked in their direction from any point on the river. On the basis of Kober's testimony, it cannot be held that the signs were illegible, for he declared that he - "wasn't exactly looking for" - any signs. One of these signs was brought into Court. This Court finds that the sign brought in was not only visible, but could have been read at least 1,000 feet away. In the opinion of this Court, the Government's action in regard to devices and warnings on the above dam 7 at the time of the accident was reasonable, that no negligence on the part of the Government has been shown, and that the United States cannot be held liable to libellants in this case. Counsel have presented and discussed in their briefs several decisions which have held the Government liable but which are based on dissimilar factual situations.
In Dye v. United States, 210 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1954), plaintiffs' decedents were drawn over a dam in the Ohio to their deaths by an increase in current caused by defendant's employees. The dam was constructed in part of movable wickets which when opened considerably increased the flow and current of the water of the river over the dam. Although the dam may have been safe when the wickets were closed, the public had no means of knowing whether the wickets were open or shut, and there was no sign explicitly warning of the danger created by the open wickets. Further, it was apparent in Dye that the government employee whose duty it was to keep a lookout for boats approaching the dam when the wickets were down or open did not do so on the day of the accident.
Bevilacqua v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 493 (W.D.Pa.1954) involved dam 8 on the Allegheny. Plaintiffs' decedents were killed when their boat plunged over the dam in the darkness of night. The presence of the dam was marked by warning lights when the lock was in operation, and by warning lanterns similarly placed when the lock was not operating. On the night of the accident, the duty lockman failed to light the lanterns, so no warning was given.
In Chelette v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 653, (E.D.Tex.1964), an action brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act, libellant's boat struck a log floating in the river channel. The log was part of much debris which had been pushed into the channel by Government workmen cleaning up a Reserve Fleet nest area.
Judgment will be directed for the United States. It is so ordered. Pursuant to Admiralty Rule 46 1/2 this opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.