of Highways for the Pennsylvania Department of Highways. Such an action is not precluded by the sovereign immunity doctrine as applied in Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff has submitted a survey of other state and federal
court holdings which shed additional light on the question of the scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine. Although these cases are not determinative of the issue presently before the Court, they do represent the so-called "majority view" which supports plaintiff's proposition.
In their Motion to Dismiss, defendants also contend that the causes of action for Wrongful Death entitled, "First Cause of Action" (Para. 21-24) and "Second Cause of Action" (Para. 25-28) of the Complaint are barred by the Statute of Limitations in that they were not commenced within one year after the death of plaintiff's decedents as required by the Act of April 26, 1855, 12 P.S. § 1603. Plaintiff does not oppose the dismissal of these Wrongful Death Actions contained in the first two counts of the Complaint on the above grounds and is content to pursue only the Survival Actions.
Finally defendants Wagner and Strickler contend that all of plaintiff's actions should be dismissed since the Complaint is so vague and indefinite as to fail to state a claim against them. This argument, briefly stated, is that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Complaint fail to aver whether the alleged negligence occurred during Wagner's or Strickler's tenure as County Superintendent of Highways.
As an alternative to dismissal, defendants request a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) which would compel plaintiff to specify when and how each defendant, Wagner and Strickler, supposedly committed their breaches of duty.
We will deny both of defendants' requests. It is our opinion that the Complaint complies sufficiently with the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, my Brother, Judge Van Dusen, has accurately commented that because of the many discovery procedures presently available to litigants in the federal courts, district judges should exercise their discretion sparingly in ordering more definite statements. Greater Valley Terminal Corp. v. Peltz St. Terminals, 21 F.R.D. 167, 169 (E.D.Pa.1957).
And now, this twenty-third day of December, 1965 it is ordered that the Motion of Defendants, Fred Wagner and C. Blaine Strickler, to Dismiss be and the same is granted as to Plaintiff's Causes of Action for Wrongful Death and is denied as to Plaintiff's Survival Actions.
It is further ordered that the request by Defendants, Fred Wagner and C. Blaine Strickler, for a more definite statement is denied.