as proper venue, of the original action accrue to prospective plaintiffs similarly situated, if they choose to intervene in the original class action.
There is much to be said for and against each of these contentions by Cayuga and plaintiff intervenors.
Without attempting to analyze thoroughly in this opinion the arguments and contentions of each side, I am of the opinion that intervenors in a spurious class suit such as the class action in the present case, need not independently satisfy venue requirements, but may stand in the shoes of the party who brought the class suit on their behalf. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed 371 U.S. 801, 83 S. Ct. 13, 9 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1962); Escott v. Barchris Const. Co., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965); 4 Moore Federal Practice, 147, 148 (2d Ed. 1963).
In view of my conclusion that there was proper venue for the intervenor actions and that the motions of Cayuga to dismiss them must be denied, it is unnecessary to discuss the intervenors' other contention, that by withdrawing its motion to dismiss the original action and filing an answer to the original complaint on the merits, Cayuga waived its privilege (see Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 84 L. Ed. 167, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939), to assert a lack of proper venue, except to say that there is good authority for this waiver contention. See Drabik v. Murphy, 246 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1957); U.S. for Use and Benefit of Bryant Electric Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 297 F.2d 665, 669 (2d Cir. 1962).
Service of the intervenor complaints was effected on Cayuga by delivering a copy of the complaint to Cayuga's attorney of record purportedly in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Such service is proper, Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1962, Luongo, J.), and, accordingly, Cayuga's motion to quash the service must be denied.
Cayuga also was named as one of the defendants in the thirteen independent suits which were filed on January 4 and 5, 1965. It has moved to dismiss these thirteen independent suits as to it on the contention that venue as to it in these suits is improper because at the time they were instituted it was not "found" nor "transacting business" in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The plaintiffs contend that the special antitrust venue provision applicable here should be liberally construed so as to render amenable to suit in this District a corporation which up until the time of suit and presumably during the time that the alleged antitrust violations took place, transacted substantial business in this District, although it actually had left the jurisdiction before a suit was instituted. See Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl J. Austad & Sons, Inc., 343 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1965); L'Heureux v. Central American Airways Flying Service, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md. 1962).
The court cannot agree. The venue statutes are phrased in the present tense, clearly referring to the time that a complaint is filed with the court. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has counseled us that " the requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy, is to be given a 'liberal' construction." Olberding v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340, 98 L. Ed. 39, 74 S. Ct. 83 (1953). Finally, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has specifically found on facts similar to those in this case that venue is improper absent a showing of waiver, in a district when a defendant foreign corporation did not transact business at the time of the antitrust suit despite the fact that it did business in the district some time prior to the institution of the suit. Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 230 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1956).
I conclude from these considerations that the requirement of venue in this suit must be satisfied as of the time the suit was commenced. See 7 Moore Fed. Practice, 1493, 1494 (2d ed. 1964); Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. Mead Corp., 189 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Note, 8 Villanova Law Review 408 (1963). Since Cayuga was not a resident or inhabitant of this District and had no agent here at the time of suit and since it was not licensed to do business nor to transact business here at the time of suit, venue in this District is improper as to Cayuga unless Cayuga has waived its venue objections.
Plaintiffs assert that by the mere fact of doing business in this District prior to the institution of these suits, Cayuga has waived its objections to venue in this District. In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 84 L. Ed. 167, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939), the Supreme Court held that objections to venue in a federal district court could be waived when a corporation in compliance with a state statute regulating the conduct of affairs of foreign corporations within the state appointed a local agent for service of process upon it. The "actual" designation or appointment of such an agent creates a true contract of consent to be sued within the state. The consent extends to cases in federal courts, based upon federal causes of action as well as those in which diversity of citizenship is the basis of jurisdiction. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 84 L. Ed. 537, 60 S. Ct. 215 (1940).
In Sunbury Wire Rope Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 230 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1956), an antitrust suit was instituted in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against a foreign corporation which had done business in Pennsylvania for several years but had removed itself from the state prior to the time that the antitrust suit was filed against it. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the foreign corporation had waived its federal venue objections when, following Pennsylvania statutory law, in applying for leave to withdraw its Pennsylvania certificate of registration as a foreign corporation it had filed in the office of the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth, a document which contained the following provision:
"6th. The corporation consents that lawful process against it in any action or proceeding upon any liability or obligation incurred within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania before the issuance of the certificate of withdrawal hereby applied for may be served upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania after the issuance of such certificate of withdrawal."