There is likewise no merit in defendants' contention that the procedure followed in selection of the jury was inadequate.
The jury was selected in strict accordance with Criminal Rule 24(a). It also complied fully with all suggestions contained in dicta of the Court of Appeals in Stirone v. United States, 341 F.2d 253, 256 (C.A. 3, 1965). Cf. United States v. Sigal, 341 F.2d 837, 840, 847 (C.A. 3, 1965) and Haith v. United States, 342 F.2d 158, 159 (C.A. 3, 1965).
The trial judge was present at all times during the voir dire and permitted all questions desired by counsel to be asked. The Court sua sponte suggested that a pertinent question in this case would be whether the jurors had had any dealings with the F.H.A. (Tr. 6, 27). This question was asked, of a group of jurors including Helen Wagner, No. 126 on the list (Tr. 10, 13). The question was repeated in simpler language by Mr. Teitelbaum (Tr. 22), and five jurors stated they had had F.H.A. loans: Margaret Hornyak, Hyman Weisman, Thomas Zolbe, Margaret Giansante, and Jean Elaine Gaydeski (Tr. 22-24). Of these, Zolbe was discharged for cause, on the ground that his brother was with the F.B.I. Weisman was removed on the Government's second challenge. Hornyak was eliminated by Mr. Teitelbaum on his third challenge. Gaydeski was struck by Mr. Libenson, counsel for Cooperman, on his fifth challenge, and Giansante on his seventh.
It thus appears that counsel for defendants did not consider the circumstance of a juror having had an F.H.A. loan to be of much importance. (See comments of Mr. Teitelbaum at Tr. 27).
We therefore do not attach much weight to the subsequently filed undated affidavit of a Mellon Bank assistant manager to the effect that Helen Wagner and her husband "have an FHA Title I Home Improvement Loan #58018, dated September 2, 1964, for twenty four (24) payments at $13.76 a month", the balance on September 15, 1965 being $123.84 for furnace installation.
It is to be noted that counsel do not say when they obtained this information, or whether they had it at the trial, or whether if they had had it then it would have made any difference in their handling of the case. We cannot believe that it would have been of any significance in view of what has been set forth above.
In view of the small amount involved and the fact that defendants make no charge of any actual irregularity against Mrs. Wagner, it would seem that her failure to disclose this small loan was doubtless due to inadvertence, lapse of memory, or unfamiliarity with business details perhaps handled by her husband. It seems impossible that it can have affected in any way the outcome of the case or the fairness of the proceedings in this Court.
For the foregoing reasons defendant's motions are denied.
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